Does the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] have the economic muscle to sanction any member state that violates its statutory laws? Granted that they have, are these sanctions efficacious? Let’s look at this from a political economy perspective.
In a bid to dissuade Col. Mamady to release President Alpha Conde from captivity and return Guinea to constitutional democracy, leaders of the Economic Community of West African States held an extraordinary meeting on September 15, 2021, in Ghana’s capital, Accra, to decide the fate of the coup leaders. After the extraordinary meeting, the bloc suspended Guinea from its activities and sanctioned the Junta that overthrew President Alpha Conde’s government.
According to National Public Radio[NPR], sanctions became popular after World War I as a measure to pressure an entity not to do something. In this case, sanctions are tools used to dissuade a country, group, individual, and organization from engaging in crime and unconstitutional activities. In this case, economic, social, and political sanctions were rolled out against Col. Mamady Doumbouya, members of the September 5, 2021 coup, and their families for engaging in constitutional illegalities.
In order to expand my argument, it’s imperative to discuss West Africa’s population and sync it with other factors to set the parameter for further analysis.
According to Worldometers.info, the population of West Africa is 414,433,838 as of Friday, September 24, 2021. In my political economy, I learned that a bigger population has the propensity to stimulate economic growth. As a result, it’s expected that West Africa’s population would stimulate economic activities to promote the West African economy. But statistics published on ECOWAS’s website contradict the population theory.
ECOWAS‘s own website report that the “total trade of the region has averaged $208.1 billion. Nigeria accounted for most of the trade volumes. Nigeria alone accounts for approximately 76% of the total trade, followed by Ghana[9.2%], and the Ivory Coast[8.64%]. Mining and agriculture recorded higher trading activities. The regional economy is import and export-based, not manufacturing.
Interestingly, Guinea was not mentioned. Instead, OEC reports in 2019, that Guinea exported gold worth $2.36B to the United Arab Emirates and imported rice for $189M from China. Guinea’s fastest-growing import markets between 2018 and 2019 were China[$226M], Germany[$38.9M], and Turkey[$29.8M]
From the statistics above, no West African nation was mentioned to be Guinea’s top export or import partner. This means that Guinea’s economy does not depend on the West African economy but non-West African members such as the United Arab Emirates, Germany, and China. West African nations are not taking advantage of what comes with the huge population. It’s not just Guinea that is not trading with the regional bloc but a West African syndrome, where trade among member states is largely fragmented and disjointed.
According to the Council of Foreign Relations, “sanctions may achieve their desired economic effect but fail to change behavior.” In the context of this analysis, sanctions can work if the one enforcing sanctions is more powerful than the one being punished. In the case of ECOWAS vs Guinea, does the former have the economic power to sanction the latter since their economies are not fully interested?
ECOWAS, per its constitution, is obliged to prescribe sanctions against the junta and its allies but lacked the political and economic will to ensure the sanctions worked to the fullest. To some extent, travel bans may work because they can identify and arrest allies of the September 5 coup in Guinea. On the other hand, ECOWAS cannot enforce economic sanctions against Col. Mamady Doumbouya and his allies. This is based on the fact that Guinea’s economy doesn’t depend on the West African economy and vice versa. If so, how then did the regional bloc impose economic sanctions on the junta and its allies?
It’s against this background that I argue that sanctions, especially the ECOWAS economic embargo against the junta cannot be effective when the former and latter’s economies are not intertwined. From the statistics discussed above, Guinea’s top rice import country is China. Not any of Guinea’s neighbors.
A fragmented economic outlook doesn’t support ECOWAS interim policy against the junta but further pushes Guinea away to China and non-West African nations. It’s on this trajectory that I predict that ECOWAS’s actions against the junta fraternity were reactionary and rhetoric in nature without political and economic clouds.
The coup in Guinea was financed and orchestrated by invisible hands and as such the junta has nothing to lose should ECOWAS impose sanctions on the country. Mamady and his cronies wield more power and can toy with ECOWAS since they have the backing of powerful non-African countries.
Like it is averred in your write up, Guinea isn’t involved in colossal trading with West African States. Against this backdrop, the junta is in a better position now and they will never be subverted to any sanctions from ECOWAS.
ECOWAS knows that its powers have a limit and there wouldn’t be any sting in the sanctions. The junta will only be the ones to decide the next line of action for Guinea and no external pressure would coerce them into giving up the running of the country.
Very deep response.