Political Vigilantism and Human Security in Kumasi Metropolis

This research was conducted by Osei Godfred Amankwah, a security and development analyst

ABSTRACT

The democratic dispensation of Ghana is fraught with spates of violent acts perpetrated by political vigilante groups which pose threats to human security of residents. Consequently, this study uses a qualitative approach to explore political vigilantism and its effects on human security in the Kumasi metropolis of Ghana. The purposive sampling procedure was used in selecting key informants from three sub-areas in the metropolis, representatives of the police, District Assembly, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), media and political party executives from the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The snowball sampling approach was further used in selecting ten political vigilantes while 54 residents were similarly sampled using convenience sampling. The study revealed that the quest for jobs and income mainly motivate people to join political vigilante groups. It was also identified that the political vigilante groups are strategically sophisticated. These sophisticated strategies thus has ramifications on the human security of individuals by way of: causing fear and want, deaths, chronic health problems, physical environmental crises, poverty, disrupting economic activities and the sources of income for people, widening inequality, disenfranchising people and disturbing the broader society. The study recommended that Government should make sustainable jobs and livelihood empowerment programmes available for the alarming youthful population. It also recommended that political parties should have the political will to disband such groups and ensure they do not interfere in the discharge of the duties of the national security apparatus when individuals engaged in political vigilante offences and other crimes of similitude are caught.  

List of Abbreviations

Background of the Study
Democracy has gained recognition as one of the most cherished and tested political instruments for good governance, sustainable development and significant transformation in most countries, thus either in developed or in less developed countries in contemporary times (Dervis, 2006). Free, fair and competitive elections in which almost all adult men and women have equal rights to vote and equal rights to stand for elective offices with rigorous and effective electoral administration are crucial aspects of liberal democracy (Scheuerman, 2004). However, regardless of the adoption of liberal democracy and its indispensable benefits in most countries, the selection of leaders through competitive politics has been marked by episodes of events such as flawed elections, violence and political conflicts to mention a few, that threaten liberal democracy, cause wanton destruction and gravely affect human security (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Offe, 2011).
One of such phenomenon that is making democracy unpopular, with its cascading effects on human security especially in Africa is political vigilantism. The term political vigilantism in this study denotes individuals or groups usually youth groups, who are enlisted and engaged based on their affiliation or membership of a political party to undertake security roles such as protection of ballot boxes and papers, ensuring safety during party rallies, party meetings, party primaries, and protecting political aspirants, amongst others on behalf of the political parties.
In this study, human security refers to protection of people from repression, torture, abuse, ill treatments, violence, other hurtful forms of disruptions and the promotion of the welfare of such individuals. In that regards, any irregular occurrence that has the tendency of causing uneasiness on the part of ordinary people comprises a threat to their human security. The key components of human security include security from violent conflicts, poverty, humanitarian crises, epidemic diseases, injustice, inequality, fear and wants (Alkire, 2003). Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has acknowledged three pillars of human security which are: the freedom from fear, which entails the protection of the physical integrity of human beings, the freedom from want which is concerned with the provision of access to the goods and services needed to satisfy material and non-material needs, as well as the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment (Martin & Owen, 2010; Owen, 2004; UNDP, 1994).
Political vigilantism has implications for human security which include the fact that, it slightly encourages democracy, the rule of law and it has also gotten considerable positive effects on political security. Conversely, the use of violence and brute force by political vigilantes in preserving non-democratic power structures, discourages democratization and rule of law, erodes capacities for building social capital as well as lessens social and political participation among individuals, and thus impact on the political security of people in a far-reaching negative way (Omach, 2010). Political vigilantes are used to deny individuals of their rights to life without fear and that the freedom of expressions of individual electorates can be disrupted due to political vigilantism.
Political vigilantism continues to be an issue of concern in Asia, Europe, North America and Africa. Testa (2015) for instance acknowledged that, in Germany, the Nazi political party relied on its political vigilante groups known as the brown shirts to disrupt political rallies and to intimidate their rivals in the early years. The Ku Klux Klan, a political vigilante group is also said to have operated in the United States where they pursued violent attacks against African Americans in the 1880s (Nivette, 2016; Silke, 2000; Silke & Taylor, 2000). Esquadāro da Morte (Death Squad) in Brazil, Protestant B Specials in Northern Ireland among others are also well-known political vigilante groups (Asamoah, 2020; Johnston, 1996; O’Leary, 2019).
The African continent is also characterized by prevalent political vigilantism issues. In the history of Kenyan politics, for instance, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) has seen its youth wing, the Jeshi la Mzee and its political terror gang members engaged in various violent roles on behalf of the KANU politicians (Anderson, 2002; Kagwanja, 2005; Mwangola, 2007). The Kikuyu’s Mungiki militias affiliated to the Party of National Unity (PNU) are often times incited against the Kalenjin youth political vigilante groups of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which fuels electoral violence in Kenya (Mathebula, 2010; Mueller, 2008). Zimbabwe, for instance, has also been awash with political vigilante groups such that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political party recruits and indoctrinates young people into its spectra of youth groups like the National Youth Service (NYS) and the Green Bombers (Chigora, Guzura & Ndimande, 2015; Shumba, 2006).
Ghana has had its fair share of political activist groups that dates back to the pre-colonial era and with its roots traceable to the successes chalked by youth activism in Ghanaian politics during the era of the British rule. The Fourth Republic has also been characterised by the proliferation of a number of political vigilante groups throughout the nation that are very dominant in the Ghanaian political space (Gyampo, Graham & Asare, 2017). Gradually, the activities of these political vigilante groups have moved beyond voting day roles to include roles that are played during all electoral related processes, thus from the registration of voters exercise to the announcement of results and that they put up these unabated erratic violent acts at various phases of such elections which includes the pre-electoral, during and post-electoral phase, which pose damning threats to human security (Ijon, 2020).
The past two decades have seen an upsurge in the establishment of political vigilantism mostly by the two leading political parties in Ghana: the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Most of these political vigilante groups are made up of the mass unemployed youth, illiterates, drug addicts usually muscular in nature (macho men), individuals engaged in low paid jobs, either armed or unarmed who show up usually during public elections or political party events for the solitary purpose of providing security for elections and other political party activities (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Elections held in recent times, under the Fourth Republic of Ghana including by-elections, primaries, district level elections, general presidential and parliamentary elections have been filled with indelible features of violence perpetrated by these political vigilantes. This is evidenced by way of considering by-elections that were hosted in constituencies like that of: Wulensi in 2003, Odododiodoo in 2005, Akwatia in 2008, Chereponi in 2009, Talensi in 2015 and the Amenfi West by-elections in 2015 (Frempong, 2008; Ijon, 2020; Ninsin, 2016). More recent too, was the appalling usage of aggression by political vigilantes in intimidating innocent voters during the Ayawaso West Wuogon parliamentary by-election on 31st of January, 2019 (Ijon, 2020).
Notable among such political vigilante groups in contemporary Ghana, which bear names of well-known terrorist organisations or vicious creatures, or the name of their founders and others, include the Bamba Boys, Gbewaa Youth, Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys,Nima Boys, Salifu Eleven, Zongo Caucus, Veranda Boys, Supreme, Mahama Boys, Basuka Boys, Badariba, Azorka Boys, Invisible Forces, Bolga Bulldogs,Tohazie,Sese Groups, Rasta Boys, Bukurisung, Pentagon, 66 Bench,Al Quaeda, Al jazeera, NATO Forces, Nana Addo Fun Club, Bugri Nabu Fun Club, John Mahama Fun Club and Delta-Force to mention a few (Agordzo & Osei-Tutu, 2016).
The unfortunate aspect is that, according to the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), leaders of both NPP and NDC take pride in maintaining such groupings with some of these political vigilante groups even becoming untouchable within their political party structures (CODEO, 2017). Their activities have received both unconcealed and tacit endorsement by some key politicians from the NDC and the NPP (Asekere, 2020).
The ill-fated precedence the NPP and the NDC are setting is that, they are making it a norm to even reward committed members of these political vigilante groups with top level positions in their political parties which is serving as motivation for others to join (Frempong, 2008). Increasingly, as contained in the 2019 draft research report of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), these political vigilantes are being recruited into the national security apparatus as rewards for their commitment and loyalty to the NPP and the NDC (CDD, 2019).
The Kumasi metropolis is not spared when it comes to issues related to political vigilantism. It has witnessed reports of hazards posed on the lives of residents by political vigilante groups, since it is the host metropolis for some key pro NDC and NPP political vigilante groups like the Hawks, Delta Forces, Bamba Boys, Taskforce, Alidu Mafias, Maxwell Boys and Kandahar Boys (Ayee, 2017, CODEO, 2017).
The quest for jobs, income and other personal gains which are viewed as conferred on political elites should they gain political power serve as motivation factors for which people become members of these political vigilante groups (Robinson & Verdier, 2013). According to these same scholars, political vigilantism is based on a clientelism approach where economic fortunes such as jobs, income and personal material gains are used as a basis for canvassing for co-operation of people under groupings of this nature.
The plague of political vigilantism which continues to threaten the human security of Ghanaians can be traced to causative factors such as the supposed non-fulfillment of electoral promises made by the politicians to the unemployed youth, feelings of marginalization by the youth when it comes to the appointment of individuals to occupy local positions and deliberate attempts by some youth to simply control some state owned properties and public offices amongst others (Amanquandor & Duke, 2019). Political vigilantism results from mistrust in certain state institutions such as the police service and electoral commission (Alidu, 2020; Danso & Lartey, 2012). Similarly, other pundits hold that the winner-takes-all nature of Ghanaian elections is a major cause of political vigilante groups (Kpessa-Whyte & Atuguba, 2020).
The various bodies such as the national security apparatus, political parties, National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana, National Peace Council (NPC), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and some recognised institutions like the judiciary and other stakeholders have played pivotal roles in the management of political vigilantism and its effects on human security (Arthur, 2010).
There have also been some attempts by governments of Ghana that is by both current and erstwhile governments to offer suitable responses to the emerging trends of political vigilantism in Ghana. The vigilantism and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999) meant to disband vigilante groups; which include political vigilante groups and land guards; to bar acts of vigilantism in the country and to provide for related matters was for instance, passed by government in 2019 due to the alarming nature of the issues of political vigilantism in Ghana (Asekere, 2020).
From the foregoing discussions, the most applicable theories to the study that can help make arguments on how political vigilantism destabilizes human security are the youth bulge theory, the horizontal inequality theory and the structural conflict theory. The youth bulge theory is applicable to this study since it avers that societies with rapidly growing populations, faced with rampant unemployment are met with large pools of disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel, terrorists and political vigilante groups (Goldstone, 2002; Heinsohn, 2007).
The structural conflict theory is appropriate for this study because it explains how unequal structures created through political and economic exclusions, injustice, poverty, exploitation, unequal access to resources and other shortfalls in structural conditions on the part of differential social groups can serve as a basis for the formation of political vigilante groups (Collier, 2003). The horizontal inequality is also suitable for the study because it explains that the presence of severe social, economic and political inequalities coinciding with cultural differences cause culture to become a powerful mobilising agent that could lead to the formation of political vigilante groups and the use of violence (Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin, 2002).
The Kumasi Metropolis has been chosen for the study since it is a metropolis well-known for serving as the host area for the two popular notorious pro NPP and NDC vigilante groups known as the Delta forces and the Hawks respectively that are on records for the series of political violence recorded after the NPP won power in 2016 (CODEO, 2017). The Kumasi metropolis has also been chosen for this study because according to a report by the Ghana police which was reviewed on the 4th of November, 2020 it has been one of the main electoral hot spots in Ghana’s elections (Ghana Police Service, 2020). Per a report by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), the Kumasi metropolis is also one embroiled with youth unemployment, where 91.4 percent out of its economically active population is employed while 8.6 percent is unemployed (GSS, 2012).

Problem Statement
Political vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in the Ghanaian society as it has existed in the early ages of the post-independence era till date. However, it has taken on different dimensions with time, which affect the budding democratic process of Ghana. Asamoah (2014) asserts that the vigilante activities in the pre-colonial era were regime patriotic in nature. Historically, the unflinching efforts of the CPP’s Veranda Boys, through youth activism during the anti-colonial struggle, which led to the fruitful attainment of the independence of Ghana from the British encouraged the political parties of the time to form other political youthful groups whose acts were in the form of vigilantism (Paalo, 2017).
The early periods of independence were characterised by prevailing vigilantes dominated by the youth groups of various political parties such as the GYPM of the CPP, which came as a replacement for the CPP’s youth League and all other groupings of this nature that existed back then, among others (Boahen, 2000). The GYPM youth were later used for political party activities of the CPP with some of their acts in the form of vigilantism (Tetteh, 1999). Other noteworthy vigilante groups in the early post independent era also include the NLM’s Action Troopers, the Tokyo Joes and Ga Ekomefeemo Kpee. The PNDC era also came with groups like the Mobisquad, CDR, WDCs, PDCs, the Militia, the CDOs and others that were armed, with the goal of defending the political revolution (Gyampo, 2010).
Under the Fourth Republic of Ghana too, one of the approaches employed by political parties to maximize votes and brighten their chances of winning political power is the formation of political vigilante groups (Bob-Milliar, 2014). Gyampo (2010) stated that, political vigilantism has featured in Ghana’s Fourth Republics (1960-1966; 1969-1972; 1979-1981 and 1993-Present). However, early forms of political vigilantism during the inception of the Fourth Republic were narrowly associated with voting day activities where vigilantes belonging to different political parties used diverse tactics to gain advantage in the electoral process. In recent times, the activities of these political vigilante groups have expanded to include all electoral processes, thus from registration of voters to declaration of results.
Adinkrah (2005) noted that political vigilantism in contemporary Ghana is characterized by violence, instant mob justice, and attempts to supplant the powers of formal police and justice systems. Under Ghana’s Fourth Republic, macho men subsist in the records of Ghanaian election-related violence as thugs, who political leaders commonly hire during elections to snatch ballot boxes and to intimidate voters at polling stations in various places across the country (Amankwaah, 2013). These and many other actions by political vigilante groups intensify the level of insecurity on the part of individuals especially before, during and after elections (Norman, 2019).
In spite of the above, the literature abounds with several studies that offer explanations for the causes and effects of political vigilantism (Alexseev, 2006; Anderson, 2002; Meagher, 2007). Others have studied the motivations of various actors engaged in the phenomenon (Fourchard, 2012). Maunga, Mugari and Tundu (2015) explored the causes of vigilantism and argued that institutional failure and economic disparity were the major causes of vigilantism. In South Africa, Minnaar (2001) analysed the influence of vigilantism on crime and posited that vigilantism serves as response to crimes. In Ghana, the work of Gyampo (2010) and that of Adinkrah (2005) and Bob-Milliar (2014) similarly examined the causes of political vigilantism.
The majority of the research on the effects of political vigilantism in Africa and Ghana in particular focuses on the effects of political vigilantism on democracy (Asekere, 2020; Olaiya, 2014; Paalo, 2017). However, there is minimal discourse on the effects of political vigilantism on human security within the conflict literature. This suggests the paucity of research that draw out the inextricable relationship between political vigilantism and human security. The current study therefore attempts to fill this gap in literature by examining the effects of political vigilantism on human security.

Conceptual Framework

Conceptual Framework
This conceptual framework as shown in figure 1 was designed to explore the effects of political vigilantism on the human security of residents in Kumasi Metropolis. It incorporates the motives for which people join political vigilante groups. These motives are critical for determining the causes of the upsurge in the formation of political vigilante groups. They are also relevant in understanding the reasons for which the political vigilante groups employ violent and non-violent strategies which have effects on human security in the course of undertaking their activities.

• Examine the motives of people for participating in political vigilantism.
• Ascertain the strategies used by political vigilante groups.
• Scrutinise the effects of the activities of political vigilante groups on human security.
• Identify ways to manage political vigilantism and its effects on human security.
  Research Questions
  The purpose of this study as stated above could be achieved by navigating through the following objectives:
• What are the motives of people for participating in political vigilantism?
• What are the strategies used by political vigilante groups?
• What are the effects of the activities of political vigilante groups on human security?
• What are the means for managing political vigilantism?

Literature Review
This chapter is dedicated to related existing literature on political vigilantism and its effects on human security. The chapter also looks at some theories related to political vigilantism, definition of concepts and some of the researches done in relation to this topic of study. The discussions for this section will be based on the following themes: Human security, Political party activism, Vigilantism and Political vigilantism. The horizontal inequality theory of conflict, the structural theory of conflict and the youth bulge theory of conflict will be discussed in this section too.
Theoretical Framework
There exists an array of theories that can be used to elaborate on political vigilantism. However, among the multiple theories explaining political vigilantism, this research focuses on three that are very relevant to the study. The first is, Horizontal inequality theory which explains that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, it can cause profound resentment that may result in violent struggles and can serve as an undercurrent to the formation of groups such as political vigilante groups (Stewart & Brown, 2007); the second theory which is the structural theory of conflict explains how system failure causes political vigilantism and the third is the Youth-bulge theory, which focuses on how a country with rapid growing young population and unemployed youth gives room for such political vigilante groups to flourish.
Horizontal Inequality Theory
The horizontal inequality theory is derived from the classical theory known as relative deprivation theory. The relative deprivation theory dissects the psychological causes of conflicts where it views frustration and aggression as the primary sources of human capacity for violence (Stewart, 2008). Walker and Mann (1987) put it simple that relative deprivation is concerned with the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually think they can get. They therefore posited that as frustration prolongs and the feelings of deprivation of what is expected increases, there is a greater probability that the individual groups or people can resort to illegitimate activities in order to actualise their expectations in the society. The theory assumes that, the well-being of people may be affected by both individual circumstances and by how well their groups compare with others (Stewart, Brown & Mancini, 2005).
The main idea of the horizontal inequality theory is that, inequality in all forms among groups brings about a gap between one group and the other, usually a minority group as against a majority group, with the minority disadvantaged such that the minority might be impelled to use violence to seek for their rights. The theory asserts that horizontal inequalities may take the form of economic, social or political dimensions as well as cultural status between culturally defined groups.

The economic dimension of horizontal inequalities involves the possibility of owning assets, being employed, and having an income. Political horizontal inequalities are apparent when participation at higher or lower levels of political institutions is unavailable for some groups, for instance in the government, the army or the bureaucracy. Social horizontal inequality entails that in which groups are excluded from societal institutions such as education, health services, and access to water and housing among others. Inequality in cultural status encompasses one in which the group’s cultural, religious practices and symbols are not recognized by the society as a whole. The horizontal inequality theorists also propose that violent conflict is more likely when groups that share a salient identity face severe inequalities of various kinds (Langer & Stewart, 2015).
The relatively unprivileged usually react to what they perceive to be unfair redistribution of resources, or the fear of what they see to be an assault on their political power resulting in conflicts between themselves and the advantaged group (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011). The theory intend emphasize the fact that for horizontal grievances to actually result in violent conflict it depends to a large extent on whether or not (ethnic) leaders and elites are willing and able to instigate and/or organise the process of grievance formation and violent group mobilization (Jacoby, 2015). The presence of severe social, economic and political inequalities coinciding with cultural differences cause culture to become a powerful mobilising agent that could lead to the formation of political vigilante groups and the use of violence (Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin, 2002). Inequality among groups in many dimensions such as political, social as well as economic has profound implications for social stability, peace, human wellbeing and other indicators of semblance that are all elements of development.

Per the theory, where there are large inequalities in access to socio-economic resources for instance, low-income groups may mobilise to improve their position while richer groups may mobilise to protect their privileges, if there is no peaceful way to secure change (Burgoon, 2013). In short, the horizontal inequality theory illuminates that ethnicity contributes to the security, status, well-being and political influence of a group; as such ethnicity is likely to feature as part of their identity. Horizontal inequality theory also indicate that conflicts may stem from a variety of historical contexts, such as colonial policies which privilege some groups over others.
Again, from the above, it is argued that the absence of political horizontal inequalities at the elite level significantly reduces the risk of violent group mobilization, even if there are severe socio-economic horizontal inequalities at the mass level, because in these situations political elites and leaders lack the incentives to mobilize their constituents for violent conflict. The converse hypothesis also seems to hold: ethnic mobilisation and violent conflicts appear to become more likely if there is a high degree of political horizontal inequality and exclusion. This is because the self-esteem of individuals in a group is bound up with the progress of the group as a whole (Stewart, 2016). In line with this, Stewart (2016) argues that in societies where there are inequalities in resource access and outcomes, coinciding with cultural differences, culture can become a powerful mobilising agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances.
Esteban and Ray (2008) also posit that if the economic inequality in a society is severe such that it follows a fixed pattern, political violence may result. There is also increasing evidence that the presence of severe horizontal inequalities, or inequalities among groups, raises the risk of conflict (Østby, 2007; Østby, 2008; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011). Poverty, political, cultural, social as well as economic inequalities between groups predispose the groups to violent conflicts, such that eight out of ten of the world’s poorest countries are grappling, or have recently suffered, from large scale violent conflicts (Stewart, 2001). West Africa for example contains 11 of the world’s 25 poorest countries and it is currently one of the unstable regions in the World suggesting the relation between poverty and violent groupings (Sambanis, 2004). The risk of violent conflict is more obvious in poor countries as compared to rich ones, since the presence of an extensive gap between a group’s expected and actual economic well-being can lead to violent conflict (Cramer, 2003).
This theory is chosen because it vividly illuminates how group idea influences the formation of political vigilante groups. Horizontal inequality explains that the formation and actions of political vigilante groups are all primarily borne out of a group phenomenon. This implies that group identity is crucial to recruitment and maintenance of allegiance to the vigilante groups which are associated to the various political parties. The groups belonging to certain political parties who feel they have been denied equal access to resources of the country view political vigilantism as a means of redressing this instance, but often do so based on mobilisation by the elites. The presence of such political vigilante groups borne out of such inequality among groups is therefore daunting to the efforts of countries in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
Moreover, applying the theory in the study of political vigilantism, political inequality or exclusion in all forms are most likely to motivate group leaders (elites) to instigate rebellions in the form of groupings like political vigilante groups in using various means to seek for their interests. The theory unveils that political vigilante groups should be seen as groups established by more organised leadership rather than mere spontaneous ones. In applying the theory to this study, it is also established that political elites can capitalise on feelings of economic inequalities, social inequalities and inequalities of cultural status on the part of the masses usually youth in a particular political party to mobilise them in willingly joining political vigilante groups to perpetuate violence or use hostility as a means for attaining their goals. In brief, the theory is applicable to this study due to its ability to explain the extent to which the presence of inequality can give rise to groups like political vigilante groups that are mostly violent.
Structural Conflict Theory
The cardinal argument of the structural conflict theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organised (Best, 2006). In essence, the proponents of the structural conflict theory are of the belief that, incompatible interests centered on competition for resources which in most instances are assumed to be scarce are the major contributing factors for social conflicts (Collier, 2003). Impliedly, political vigilante groups are formed when there are unequal structures created through political and economic exclusions, injustice, poverty, exploitation and other structural conditions such that there is unequal access to resources on the part of differential social groups.
Faleti (2006) argues that, structural theory of conflict explains that conflicts occur as a result of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies as well as due to the domination of one class by another. The theory divulges that, the competing interests of groups are perceived as very significant factors responsible for conflicts.
Structural theory of conflict accentuates the need to place recognition on power structures and institutions as the factors necessary for conflicts to occur. Kothari (2006) revealed that these institutions could be formal or informal thus either local or state institutions. He explained that, the problem of economic underdevelopment, unintegrated social and political institutions as well as demographic factors put pressure on available scarce resources resulting in conflict.
LeBaron (2002) observed that the structural root of conflict is the way individual thoughts and feelings are ordered or structured and also includes the cultural message that shapes the perceptions of individuals in social phenomenon in societies. In this case, LeBaron (2002) effectively located conflict management in line with our culture since he was of the belief that conflicts begin in the minds of men and that it is in the minds of men that it can be resolved.
To LeBaron (2002) in dealing with conflicts, there should be a focus on addressing cultural stereotyping inequality and eliminating the structures of domination and exploitation underlying it, these would encourage the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. The structural theory of conflict posits that problems of overpopulation, economic underdevelopment, un-integrated social and political institutions as well as other factors that put pressure on human amongst other factors are the basic underpinnings for explaining the causes of conflicts between groups and individuals (Faleti, 2006). The youth foot soldiers of political parties view political vigilante groups as a means to protect their positions, access to power, interests and sources of livelihoods when the above factors as well as other structures fail. This results in the use of violent and counter violent among youthful factions hampering the target of the state in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. In sum, the structural theory of conflict is appropriate in this study due to its ability to clearly explain the extent to which structural failure in the form of unfulfilled electoral promises, the survival strategies of elite groups within political parties, lack of socio-political unity, lack of genuine access to national institutions of governance, mistrust in electoral bodies, corruption and highly personalized form of governance like the winner-takes-all result in political vigilantism and its associated violent activities that disturb human security.
Youth Bulge Theory
The youth bulge theory is used for this study because of its applicability to youth related issues and the fact that majority of the people engaged in vigilantism are youth. The youth are central elements in the formation of political vigilante groups, so the youth bulge theory is important to offer an understanding on cardinal political issues in the study such as how the alarming rise in the youthful population has promoted the acts of political vigilantism. The youth bulge theory assumes that, societies with rapidly growing young populations often end up with rampant unemployed and large pools of disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel, terrorist groups amongst other violent groups like political vigilante groups that impedes sustainable development if they are not well managed.
Hendrixson (2004) simply puts it that society with growing youthful population is a historically volatile population. The theory also assumes that, weak political institutions are major causes of youth bulge related violence and social unrest. The discourse specifically equates large percentage of young men with an increased possibility of violence particularly where Government may not have the ability to support them. Stockard and O’Brien (2002) argue that psychological and social factors compel large cohorts of young men to engage in violent acts. Youth bulge theory indexes that, the acceleration of population growth rate is responsible for the creation of both large bulges and the increasing risk for violent conflict directly (Kaiku, 2011).
To Kaiku (2011) the higher the rate of population growth, the higher the probability that the economic growth will not catch up leading to conflicts over scarce resources. Resource scarcity and the competition for resources are therefore implied as the underlying rationale for youth becoming violent. Urdal (2006) notes that youth grievances may eventuate in circumstances where limited job opportunities available to a growing youth cohort result in uprisings and armed conflict. Adelaja and George (2020) for instance stated that the lack of employment by young men and almost no family ties leave them unattached and unavailable for mobilization into armed movements. Young men are easily recruited or indoctrinated into fundamentalist ideologist in the context of uncertainty when they are unemployed.
Goldstone, Kaufmann and Toft (2012) observed that, large youth cohorts facing institutional crowding in the labor market or educational system, lack of political openness, and crowding in urban centers may be aggrieved, paving the way for political violence. Youth bulge theory opines that, mass youth unemployment and graduate unemployment make the youth a ready-made tool for unscrupulous politicians to be recruited into political vigilante groups. The youth posed with few alternatives for income generation may organise to better themselves and their communities through engagement in such political vigilante groups. In summary, linking the theory to the study of political vigilantism it can be noted that the youth bulge theory is concerned with how the existence of multiple socio-economic factors like resource scarcity, poverty, unemployment, under-employment and rapid urbanization amongst others predispose the youthful population to violence as a means to an end.
The youth bulge theory looks at how the impoverished and lower statuses of the youth in most highly populated demographic areas cause them to become readily available tools for political vigilante groups. Looking at political vigilantism from the youth bulge view, it can be seen as a means by which the growing youthful population seeks to address inequality amongst others. According to the theory, the youth are marginalised to the extent that they are easily mobilized by politicians with the aim of getting other benefits. The youth bulge theory uses the demographic dynamics in giving meanings to the incidence of political vigilantism and violence.
The unemployment and under employment, poverty, inequality as well as countless others contribute to the rise in political vigilante groups which poses challenges to the moves aimed at attaining the Millennium Development and Sustainable Development Goals. In short, the youth bulge theory is relevant for this current study on grounds that the theory has gotten all it takes to give meanings to political vigilante groups by touching on demographic contributing factors like the fast growing young population and unemployment on the part of youth and the degree to which they can result in formation of vigilante groups.
Conceptual Issues
Vigilantism
In many developing democracies, vigilantism is commonly viewed as taking the law into one’s own hands and the violent display of thug force to protect the interest of a group that one belongs to (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974). There are some authors that maintain that vigilantes are always private (Johnston, 1996) while others also envision vigilantism as undertaken by state agents (O’Connor, 2007). To some scholars, vigilantism consists of (threats of) violence (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974) but some scholars view vigilantism as including non-violent groups like Neighbourhood Watches (Hine, 1997). It is also perceived as consisting of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established socio-political order, which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion.
The perceived goal of vigilantism also differs widely such as defending an established socio-political order (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974), improving law in lawless setting (Alvarez & Bachman, 2016), putting an end to an unpleasant situation (Ayyildiz, 1995) and the apprehension and punishment of (alleged) criminals (Zimring, 2004). Similarly, some claim vigilantism is always a calculated act (O’Connor, 2007) while others also recognise more spontaneous forms (Adinkrah, 2005). Victims of vigilantism also differ in literature which includes perpetrators of crime (Brown, 1975), law enforcement officers (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974), minority groups (Sederberg, 1978), whalers (Kawashima, 2013) and even witches (Adinkrah, 2005).
Haas (2010) referred to vigilantism as any spontaneous and relatively instant act of private citizens, carried out without consulting the police or justice department, against suspects/perpetrators of criminal act of which they are a direct victim or direct witness as bystander. This definition excluded pre-meditated acts of vigilantism as well as vigilantes who are not direct victims or bystanders but those who act on behalf of others. Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) used the term crime control vigilantism to refer to vigilantism against (alleged) perpetrators who are seen to have escaped justice as a result of inefficiency, corruption or leniency on the part of Government. It is often linked to specific worries about a particular crime problem (Hil & Dawes, 2000).
Abrahams (2003) also opined that vigilantism is concerned with an organised attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts. Vigilantism covers a broad range of violent acts ranging from dissident violence, to the legal exercise of physical coercion by a regime or its representatives. Fundamentally, there exist three intended purposes that appear to be predominant which are: crime control, social group control, and regime control.
Social group control vigilantism has diverse manifestations which are based on communalism thus it has primordial characteristics such as race, religion, caste, tribe, and the like), economic, or better still political features. Violence intended to regulate pariah communal groups constitutes the first subtype. Unlike crime control vigilantism, this form of established violence, often appears minimally rooted in government ineffectiveness per se, than in the insignificance of formal avenues of redress and can serve as a barrier for attaining sustainable peace and development (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974).
Vigilantism involves the activities of organised informal, non-state policing groups to combat crime outside of the legitimate conduits of law enforcement due to the inability of the law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order suitably (Agordzo & Osei-Tutu, 2016). They stated in furtherance that, vigilantism is usually characterised with violence such as instant mob justice, and attempts to supplant the powers of formal police and justice systems which hamper sustainable development and other sustainable peace moves.

Political Vigilantism
Political vigilante groups are part of the extensive concept of party apparatchiks who are agents of a government or political party “aparat” (apparatus) that comprise amongst others party foot-soldiers who work tremendously to ensure the election of their respective political parties into power and can be relied upon to defend the political party without compromising (Gyampo, Graham & Asare, 2017).
Political vigilantism refers to any organised group of individuals who pledge to and are willing to execute the ideologies/objectives/plans of a political party. Mostly, political vigilante groups revolve around a blend of uneducated, unemployed/underemployed and few secondary/tertiary/learned citizens that are generally known for undertaking various duties on behalf of politicians (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Resnick & Casale, 2014).
The activities of political vigilante groups are based on the notion of reciprocity and the provision of personalised goods with its actors seeking to develop themselves (Grätz, 2007). The political vigilante members believe that public office holders (patrons) are wealthy and control massive resources so they can serve as conduits for them to get access to such resources (Daddieh & Bob-Milliar, 2012). Consequently, they work hard to win and retain power for their political elites with the expectation that the political elite will share the state resources with them once they are in government (Bob-Milliar, 2014).
Kanyadudi (2010) asserts that youth groups in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are at the peripheries regarding core matters of their political parties. Impliedly, he is of the conviction that these political vigilante groups are not substantially integrated into the official structures of their parent political parties. It is believed that political vigilantism in Ghana has it historical antecedence from youth activism in politics during the British colonial era when the Nkrumah’s ‘Veranda Boys’ of CPP set the pace for party youth activism in Ghana.
Although, the political vigilante groups in Ghana are not integrated officially and systematically into mainstream politics, they are associated with a number of activities, in their attempt to advance the fortunes of their parental political parties like: creating awareness on the “ideologies” of the political parties, partaking in election related matters (voter registration; elections monitoring-polling agents); promoting party manifestoes; peaceful protests; rioting/violent protests; offering private securities to the political parties; seizing and controlling public facilities; and undertaking election violence to mention a few (Gyampo, 2012).
The labor-intensive nature of SSA politics, and by extension Ghanaian politics makes it a prime responsibility to maintain such political vigilante groups to assist in reaching the remotest parts of the state with what their political parties stand for and their ideologies (Bob-Milliar, 2014). In addition, monitoring and observer duties by political vigilante groups have significantly promoted fairness and transparency in the electioneering process; they have also served as elements very crucial for legitimizing and accepting elections results (Gyampo, 2012). He further noted that in terms of composition, it emerged that the members of these political vigilante groups are predominantly private security personnel, heavily built men and women as well as young people who are mainly unemployed.
In the reverse, however, he opined that the monitoring of elections by political vigilante groups has its disadvantages as well (Gyampo, 2012). The political vigilante groups of the NDC and NPP have engaged in fiery clashes at polling centers or electoral areas, instead of maintaining calm as required by the Electoral Commission (EC). Violent clashes continue to be witnessed by Ghanaians mostly during campaigns, during elections and after elections re-affirming the destructive potential of political vigilantism to sustainable peace and sustainable development (Abbink, 2005).
Political vigilante groups are known for contributing to or perpetrating electoral or election violence in Ghana (Bob-Milliar, 2012). Elections related violence such as snatching of ballot boxes, voter and opponent intimidation have characterized Ghana’s elections since 1992, and such acts are directly or indirectly traced to these political vigilante groups (Bob-Milliar, 2012). According to the Center for African Democratic Affairs (CADA) the situation is catalyzed by the patronage system that has engulfed the nation’s politics coupled with weak security/deliberate acts by politicians and unprofessional security agents (CADA, 2012). Political vigilante groups have engaged in violent chaotic demonstrations or impetuous acts in each regime such as vandalizing their own party properties, including campaign cars, party paraphernalia, office buildings amongst others.
Unlawful seizure and control over facilities of public good has become a common practice by party youth movements in Ghana, since victorious party foot soldiers unlawfully seize public facilities and objects such as bus terminals, in order to seek rents for themselves and their allies, as rewards for their vigorous campaigns (including violence) to win power (CADA, 2012). For instance, the NPP political vigilante groups confiscated and controlled public revenue generating properties, including office buildings, cars, toll booths, public toilets, and lorry parks (or bus terminals), when the party won power in 2001. Consequently, and as the norm continued, the NDC youth wing also forcibly took these socio-economic ventures from the NPP occupants when their mother party beat the NPP in the 2008 polls (Bob-Milliar, 2014).
The political vigilante group members perceptibly engage in direct violence, where the cost of their violent roles on human security can be traced back to actual actors who undertook them. Personal or direct violence is therefore the type of violence in which there is an actor that commits the violence (Galtung, 1969). Accordingly, this direct violence committed by these political vigilante people is built into the political structures of the society and has become an essential part of the society causing the violent acts to appear normal particularly on the part of the political vigilante members and their financiers. Structural violence is defined as an injury that is not immediately attributable to an acting subject, but one that is built into the structures of the society and manifests itself as inequality of power, resources, and life opportunities (Galtung, 1990).

Human Security
The security of humans remains a very pertinent part of their well-being and a very significant reason for sustainable development. The term human security was first introduced in 1994 by a UNDP Human Development Report to focus security from the point of view of people, as opposed to the security of states (Johns, 2014). The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) views human security as a people-centered security or security with a human face which places human beings rather than states at the focal point of security considerations (UNIDIR, 2009).
Remarkably, discussions on security, sustainable peace and sustainable development have been focused on human security more than the security of states in contemporary times. In defining human security, the UNDP (1994) states that: for too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states and that security has been equated with threats to a country’s sovereignty with nations seeking arms to ensure their security. The emerging concerns of human security all over the world are job security, health security, environmental security and security from crime to mention a few. The simplest definition of human security, according to Jolly and Ray (2007) is primarily an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual and not the state. Tadjbakhsh (2005) also conceptualizes human security as freedom from fear and freedom from want. That is, to be secure is to be free from both fear (of physical, sexual or psychological abuse, violence, persecution, or death) and from want (of gainful employment, food, and health).
The United Nation (UN) Commission on Human Society (CHS) gives a broader definition of human security as the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment (CHS, 2003). According to the CHS, this means: Protecting basic rights and freedoms; Protecting people from severe and widespread threats and circumstances; Motivating and empowering people to take their destiny into their own hands; and providing the necessary political, social, environmental, economic, military as well as cultural framework and systems within which people can live meaningful and dignified lives (CHS, 2003). Thus, the key premises of human security contained in the UNDP 1994 Report are: (i) its focus on freedom from fear and freedom from want, and (ii) its four-fold emphasis includes universality, interdependence, and people-centeredness which are all indicators of sustainable development.
The elements of human security include security from violent conflict, poverty, humanitarian crises, epidemic diseases, injustice, inequality, fear, and wants (Alkire, 2003). Violence borne out of political vigilantism and others remains one major threat to human security in that it threatens people’s opportunities for sustainable development. Political vigilantism denies humans the security to engage in their commercial, agricultural and other activities hence a barrier to sustainable development.
According to the CHS (2003) some strategies must be put in place to ensure the security of people in relation to violent acts such as that which is caused by political vigilante groups. These include protecting people caught up in violence, designing a holistic approach to protect people caught up in violence and curbing further violence: empowering people recovering from violence with the aim of enhancing development.

Political Party Activism
The issue of political party activism particularly by the youth, has received massive attention in recent years (Asante, Hershey, Kajubi, Kuperus, Msoka & Patterson, 2020; Bob-Milliar, 2012; Norris, 2007; Rainsford, 2017; Resnick & Casale, 2011). Activism is usually associated with collective or group action by ordinary people, typically volunteers, who come together to change what they consider to be unacceptable or unfair circumstances (Zimmerbauer, Suutari & Saartenoja, 2012). In his study of what he refers to as occasional activists within the two major political parties in America, Nexon (1971) made a distinction of activists from other party members based on the amount of time and effort people dedicated to the candidate they support in elections.
Similarly, Whiteley and Seyd (2002) defined political activism by focusing mainly on the nature and form of the intensity of a political activity. In relation to this, they noted that any political participation that takes a bunch of time and effort on the part of those who are involved in it, can be regarded as high-intensity participation. The Soviet government was the first in contemporary history to pay unique attention to the organisation, the indoctrination of youth and political party activism in general (Hornsby, 2016). As early as 1903, Lenin called for the need for youth to be organised under the leadership of the Communist party, where he designed his revolutionary programme in a way that fascinated the young people (Read, 2013). It was due to his advocacy and other moves that the all-Russian Communist League of Youth, known as Komsomol was formed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1918, with the vision of utilizing the youthful passion in building a prosperous Russian society for the next generation (Kudayarova, 2010).
The young people within the ages of 14 to 26 were given the chance to join the Komsomol while its sub-divisions, the V. I. Lenin Young Pioneers and Little Octobrists were opened to children from the ages of nine to 15, and seven to nine respectively (Omel’chenko & Pilkington, 2006). The Komsomol was formed with goals and tasks such as: increasing and utilizing initiatives, checking the influence of the church, curbing foreign influences even in music and styles of dressing, combating parasitism, strengthening the arts, sciences, and cultural activities and instilling discipline, which was supposed to be voluntary among these young ones especially in the schools (Neumann, 2006; Sadowska, 2016). The group was also established to co-operate with teachers in improving academic standards by helping weaker students, and in fact, to strive in all areas in achieving the stage of communism on the part of these young ones in order that they would have become appropriate citizens in the Soviet State (Slezin & Balantsev, 2013).
The utmost vision of the Komsomol also included growing faithful defenders of their political party, builders of socialism and above all nurturing young ones who were filled with communism. The Komsomol encouraged youth activism such that most young people who were members, undertook voluntary works, engaged in non-violent marches and rallies as well as participated in officially endorsed political activities of the CPSU. Members of the Komsomol were trained on Soviet citizenship, trained to act as leaders for Young Pioneer groups, served as counselors in their summer camps while they were being prepared for future party membership and its other associated responsibilities. These young ones were made to accept a new way of acting toward women and fellow men, referred to by Soviet sources as brotherly and comradely (Soroka, 2018).
Active Communist Party or Komsomol (Young Communist League) members who were physically fit and were of faultless reputations, after going through series of vetting organised by different Communist Party committees, were made Apparatchiks with the aim of raising them to a level where they could have further developed their careers (O’Connor, 2006). The Apparatchiks were described as the conductors of the Communist Party since they were involved in various spheres of life and they were often seen giving instructions at plants, factories, schools, museums, theaters and others, depending on the department the Apparatchik worked in (Shleifer & Treisman, 2001).
There were even university professors among the Apparatchiks whose job included lecturing factory and collective farm workers on the benefits of Socialism. Under the Soviet Union, these Apparatchiks were Communist middle managers who supervised the implementation of decisions that were undertaken by higher authorities within their political parties to whom they were directly assigned (Hoffman, 2011). However, the Komsomol along with the CPSU collapsed in 1991 and failed to surface until around 1994 but failed to triumph afterwards (Nelson, Nelson & Kuzes, 1995). The changes in economic systems faced by Russia as of that time among other reasons led to the formation of another political activist group known in modern day as the Russian Young Reformers (Petersson, 2008).
Russia that had become used to state control under the Soviet era, was confronted with economic crises which necessitated radical market-oriented reforms and massive privatization. This massive worst hit west capitalism as of the period brought about poverty for the Russian masses but with staggering wealth for the few. It also had in its wake crippling economic depression, rampant crime, corruption, unpaid salaries for workers and with many pensioners reduced to begging after their lifelong savings were wiped out (Ashwin & Clarke, 2002). These reforms during the post-Soviet era became widely resented giving room to a group of young individuals referred to as the Russian Young Reformers.
The Russian Young Reformers operated with the aim of gaining revenue for the new non-communist state for use in programmes meant to alleviate the socio-economic distress accompanying the sweeping changes in the Russian economic systems (Umland, 2008). They also sought to use political activism as a way of creating competition in industries, encouraging privatization, restructuring the enterprises for the sake of improved efficiency and to give the worker-citizens of Russia some ownership in the enterprises that had been theoretically theirs but in actuality never were (McFaul, Petrov & Ryabov, 2010; Stoner-Weiss, 2006). Among the numerous plans of the Russian Young Reformers included: timing the transition of enterprises to reduce the disruptions in the industrial economy, putting measures in place to allow for the movement of the workforce from the overstaffed state enterprises into new market enterprises and to open up sources of new capital for modernization and the expansion of the enterprises so as to make it possible to bring in new management talent to the Russian enterprises (Rose, Mishler & Munro, 2006).
In the United States of America (USA) too, Political Action Committees (PACs) that emerged in 1944, when the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) raised money for the re-election of then-President, Franklin Roosevelt have helped shape democracy by serving as political activist groups that voluntarily continue to pool their resources together with the aim of offering funding for or against candidates and for purposes of balloting initiatives or legislation (Magee, 2002; Powell & Grimmer, 2016). These PACs direct the contributions they raise to candidates for elective offices, mostly in the United State House of Representatives and the United State Senate (Brewer & Maisel, 2020). On the contrary too, in some cases PACs spend their funds on independent expenditures thus in propagating messages expressly promoting the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in cooperation or consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party or its agents (Charnock, 2020). Today, there are many of such PACs actively supporting elections in USA, most of which represent membership and business interests from trade groups, businesses, institutions, organisations, and individuals like the American Dental Association, National Restaurant Association, National Association of Realtors and Major League Baseball and others (Chamon & Kaplan, 2013).
In Ghana, the term political party activism is used to refer to instances where a party member or party members as well as non-party member or non-party members are undertaking one or a combination of sets of activities that can directly promote the policy and the objectives of their political parties in general (Bob-Milliar, 2012). History records that, it was through political activism that Nkrumah steered his ‘Veranda Boys’, who were mostly youth to a successful political sovereignty from the British (Paalo, 2017). The achievements of this political activist group, impelled the CPP to establish the GYPM at the aftermath of the independence era to supplant all other youthful groups that pre-existed in that era including the CPP’s own Youth League (Oquaye & Boafo-Arthur, 2006). In spite of the fact that political activism set the pace for political vigilantism and other groupings of that sort, it should be noted that activism is not the same as political party vigilantism.
Using socio-economic status (SES), individual attitudes and behavioural traits, three categories of activists are identified which are: at the top of the political party hierarchy is the patron activists, in the middle are platform activists, and at the bottom are party foot-soldiers (Bob-Milliar, 2012). First, a patron activist is an individual who holds formal membership with a political party. Majority of them keep their membership secret; as a result, their membership is mostly unknown to the generality of the rank-and-file members (Bob-Milliar, 2012). In terms of career, many of the individuals belonging to this category are self-made middle-class professionals thus constituting of academics, physicians, lawyers, bankers, senior public servants, teachers, businessmen and women to mention a few. They therefore serve as the main financiers of the activities undertaken by their political parties. In addition to making these enormous financial contributions, they also provide other logistics pertinent for the sustenance of the party works of their political parties.
Also, a platform activist is characteristically referring to a young graduate from one of the tertiary institutions in the country who has not attained the age of forty (40). These activists materialize from the ranks of the Tertiary Institution Network (TEIN) or the Tertiary Education and Students Confederacy (TESCON). The TEIN and the TESCON represent the student wings of the NDC and the NPP on the campuses of the country’s tertiary institutions respectively. Most of these platform activists are often unemployed graduates seeking for jobs. These students therefore have formal membership within the two major political parties. The platform activists work for their political parties in various capacities including acting as polling agents, electoral officers and collation officers for their political parties in the various constituencies across the country during elections (Bob-Milliar, 2019; Owusu-Nsiah, 2019). The brilliant ones among them work in the research wings where they offer their support to the party apparatus through the provision of essential information meant for purposes of guiding policy debates. There are some of them that serve as special aides to cabinet ministers or other influential politicians too. Yet, others work with the communication wing of the political parties; they are deployed daily to defend the programme and policies of their political parties in the public arena. They sometimes appear on television and radio to defend the policies of their political parties or to refute the charges of their co-competitors.
Gyampo and Obeng-Odoom (2013) have observed that since 1992, all political parties and political aspirants have thronged to the campuses of the various tertiary institutions in Ghana to do explanations of their programmes, ideologies, philosophies and manifestoes to students with the goals of whipping up their support during national elections. They therefore posited that, student activism particularly on the part of students at the tertiary level has remained one of the fundamental basis around which politics in Ghana have revolved right from the struggle for independence era till date. The onset of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, was marked by the creation of student wings on the campuses of the various tertiary institutions across the country, including the CPP’s Tertiary Students’ Charter (TESCHART), the TEIN, TESCON and others.
Finally, a party foot-soldier is typically a young man with little or no formal education, who offers a lot of his time to party work (Bob-Milliar, 2019). Many are engaged in casual work known as their “by day job” as such their engagements with the political parties are displayed at two levels: formal and informal (many of them are not registered or card bearing members). The term foot-soldier is originally associated with military personnel on foot patrols, however, in party parlance in Ghana a party foot soldier is a person who devotes extraordinary amounts of his or her time and energies in canvassing for support and votes for a political party and its candidates. The term foot-soldier was first used in newspaper advertisements sponsored by some NPP members on February 1996, where these sponsors of the NPP’s presidential aspirant, described themselves as foot-soldiers. Regardless of the fact that, the NDC prefers the name cadres for its members and activists to party-foot soldiers, the term has become popularized within the Ghanaian political arena and is being used to describe other party activists in other political parties in Ghana (Ninsin, 2016). Ninsin (2016) describes foot-soldiers as sub-national officers since they are mostly individuals serving as the transmission belt of their respective political parties. Foot-soldiers ensure that directives and party information in general coming from the national level bodies reach the grassroots and they in effects perform crucial tasks during elections and in-between elections.
In a nutshell, party activism is understood to be a reciprocal phenomenon, such that the politically active are using their “resources” (time, money and civic skills) to promote the policy goals of the political parties they support and they are expecting material rewards for their activism in these political parties, which is sometimes negotiated based on terms favourable to them between and during electioneering periods and elections (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). The failure of states to manage such activist groups result in instances where they end up resorting to the use of violence which obstructs the sustainable development and peace of such countries.

Empirical Review
Urdal (2006) conducted a comparative study on vigilantism using data from Asian and sub-Saharan African cities. The dataset which covers 55 major cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa and spans over the 1960-2006 period proved that large male youth population aged 15-24 are generally not associated with increased risks of either violent or non-violent social disturbance. The cross-sectional survey concluded that the alternative cost of youths belonging to larger youth cohorts are generally lower compared to members of smaller cohorts. According to this study, all other things being constant, the economic and social fortunes of a cohort (those born in a given year) tend to vary inversely with its relative size. This situation results in an unusually high supply of individuals with low opportunity cost, but an individual belonging to a relatively large youth cohort generally also has a lower opportunity cost relative to a young person born into a smaller cohort. The author notes that this concern is certainly valid in the case of Africa where the rapid growth in youth population between the ages of 15–24 years has led to the emergence of vigilante groups.
Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) offer valuable insight into the study of vigilantism by arguing that in the context of high levels of exclusion from economic, social and political spheres, large youth population in urban centers may become a source of instability and political violence. The study is overly skewed towards pre-electoral and violence during the elections. Also, the explanations on the causes are exclusively focused on structural or macro level explanatory factors.
Goldstone (2001) studied the involvement of youth in violence where a descriptive survey was employed aimed at understanding the reasons why the youth are involved in violence acts such as vigilantism. The mixed method was used to undertake this study. His study unveiled that generally, it is the young males who are the main protagonists of political violence and criminal acts in general. The study above failed to focus in particular on spontaneous and low-intensity unrest like non-violent protest and rioting. However, it was observed that huge youth population may also increase the risk of more organised forms of political violence like internal armed conflict and the emergence of hooligan vigilante groups.
Dixon and Johns (2001) did a correlational study on relationship between indicators of development and risk of vigilantism in Western Cape’s Khayelitsha Township, South Africa. The study employed afro-barometer conducted over a period of time and concluded that the effect of violent risk by low education and large youth populations is particularly strong in low and middle income countries, although it seems to be contingent on structural economic factors. It was concluded by this study that accessibility of large cohorts of poorly educated youth can support armed conflict and the establishment of violent youth groups including political vigilante groups.
In particular, they posited that education does not seem to have a pacifying effect on large youth cohorts joining vigilante groups in highly agrarian societies. The study recommended that focus should be on monitoring economic opportunities for young people, and particularly on providing employment or educational opportunities for youth in periods of economic decline. The approaches and findings in the various studies above are limited because they explained individual-level behavior while in reality there is very limited micro-level evidence explaining what motivates youth who engage in violence by joining political vigilante groups. The study failed to consider surveys of youth in both conflict and non-conflict settings aimed at explaining variations in perceptions and perpetration of violence such as that done by vigilante groups as well as the effects such actions have on human security.
Bateson (2012) did a correlational study on the relationship between social network, voluntary association and political participation in Belgium. The study was longitudinal which employed Belgian political panel survey which measures participation habits among sixteen-year-old Belgium in 2006 and followed up in 2008. His study established that individual’s engagement in diverse political and ethno-cultural networks promotes political discussion and exposes the individual to new information with different viewpoints which motivate them to join groups such as political vigilante groups. The study concluded that engagement in political activities can affect network base of individuals through new contacts with people and intend influence their willingness to join groups like political vigilante groups. The study also established a positive relationship between ethno cultural and political diversity with political participation such as political vigilantism.
Per the study, young people when exposed to network diversity tend to enjoy high political interest and discussion among peers that are significant with political participation, as such join political vigilante groups. Interactive relationship between participation and network diversity are therefore underlining factors for vigilantism groups. However, the study is critiqued for over emphasizing political participation instead of political vigilantism.
Quintelier, Stolle and Harell (2012) in a correlational study on politics in peer-groups, explored the causal relationship between network diversity and political participation. The study arrived at the relationship between political diversity among youth and the propensity to engage in future political action such as political vigilante groups. They also view the diversity of social networks among the young as that which motivates them to engage in participatory political acts such as political vigilantism. Core to the arguments of this paper was the mobilization potential of network density on political participation. Its focus was more on the unconventional participation than conventional participation. Yet, it did not simply identify the relationship but also indicated the possible time span within which a boost in participation could be achieved by fostering diverse political and ethno-cultural network among young people. However, by addressing the causal route of political vigilantism from mobilization into diverse social networks through to effecting political participation and vice versa, it left behind those who are more prone to be selected into these networks of political vigilante groups.
Maunga, Mugari and Tundu (2015) explored perspectives on vigilantism in the Republic of Zimbabwe using the mixed method. The main objective of the study was to explore the causes of vigilantism. The primary data was obtained using a descriptive survey design. Out of a target population of 3500 households and 55 police officers, a sample that comprised 350 home owners and 10 police officers was selected to take part in the study using simple random sampling and stratified random sampling techniques.
The study concluded that corruption on the part of the police, public mistrust in the judicial system, political factors and downward economic trajectory are some of the contributory causes of vigilantism. The study however recommended that the police and the judiciary need to address their real and practical failings, including effectively dealing with allegations of corruption within their ranks; Government must support policing initiatives as well as improve infrastructure; vigilantism needs to be prioritized and tackled as a form of crime; and a culture of violence that must be delegitimized through inculcating a human rights culture in the citizens. The study should have been done qualitatively and considered detailed study of the effects of vigilantism rather than the focus on the causes of vigilantism. The study could have considered the effects of vigilantism on human security of individuals as well.
Minnaar (2001) analysed the effects of vigilantism on crime in Western Cape, South Africa. The study employed exploratory cross-sectional designs. His study further explored that vigilante activities usually occurred as a response to the above-mentioned crimes. His study focused on an analyses of the causes, extends and forms of vigilante violence in South Africa, across a time frame that starts just before the political transition, through the period characterized by political transformation, reconciliation and the brokered peace of the post, it did not consider the tactics used by political vigilante groups. The study over emphasized the causes of vigilantism and how it can be curbed but failed to look at the effects of vigilantism. It was also concerned with vigilante groups that served as response groups for crime and not vigilante groups associated with political parties.
Bob-Milliar (2014) examined party youth activists and low-intensity of electoral violence in Ghana. The study was purely explorative and made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. The study was a qualitative study which involved the use of in-depth interviews where participants were purposively selected. The study concluded that political system of the winner monopolizing all state power comforts and discomforts all political activists. Also the study linked political vigilantism to structural and partisan factors such as youth unemployment, unfulfilled electoral promises, and survival strategies of elite groups. The study concludes that youth party foot soldiers place a high premium on capturing state power for the political elites (Bob-Milliar, 2014). As a result, the foot soldiers view the change of government as the right time to claim political opportunities in Ghana. It contends that molestation, physical assault, and violent intimidation have characterized the pre-elections, post-elections and the elections of Ghana which pose general security threats to citizens of Ghana but did not place much weight on human security. The study is limited for failure to identify systemic factors such as inequality as a cause of the actions of political vigilante groups.
Paalo (2017) explored political party youth wings and political violence in sub-Sahara Africa using Ghana as a case study. Using a case study of Ghana, the research draws some similarities, and or differences in the mechanisms through which youth wings such as political vigilante groups perpetrate violence across other parts of the sub-region. The longitudinal study of over four years involved the use of participant observation in Ghana; extensive analysis of media political discourse across Africa; and relevant secondary data. The author concluded that though youth wings are meant to contribute positively to democratic consolidation through peaceful and democratic activities with their mother parties, they mostly rather engage in aggressive, violent politics, annulling the expectation of constructive contribution from the demographic majority in the continent. The study recommended that there is need for persistent efforts to comprehensively integrate young citizens and party followers in political and democratic processes in order to reap the demographic dividend.
In spite of the above the study only identified the causes of vigilantism such as increasing youth unemployment; weak institutions or unprofessional state agents; illegitimate electoral systems; political manipulation of social cleavages, and history of violence in societies all mired in patronage political system. The study failed to examine the effects of the actions of these vigilante groups on human security.
Gyampo (2017) conducted an explanatory study on political vigilantism and democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth Republic where he examined the activities of vigilantism in Ghana from a historical perspective and highlighted the contributions of vigilantism towards electoral victories and defeats. The study also examined the negative effects of vigilantism on Ghana’s democratic practice and proffer some recommendations on the way forward but failed to look at the effects of political vigilantism on human security. It was concluded in this study that political vigilantism is fuelled by clientelistic politics in Ghana and it poses severe threats to Ghana’s efforts at consolidating democracy. The study recommended that state institutions such as the police, military and all security apparatus of the state should not only be well equipped, but must be encouraged by regime heads and political leaders to deal rigorously with all forms of threat posed by vigilante groups without fear or favour.

Source: Adapted from Galtung (1969)
There are innumerable underlining factors that motivate people to participate in political vigilantism and these factors serve as the major pivot on which political vigilantism revolves. Bob-Milliar (2014) argues that certain factors drive individuals to participate in political vigilantism which may include the quest for employments, income, appointments among others. However, for one to join a political vigilante group there must be in existence some causative factors such as structural factors, inequality and youth bulge factors including economic related issues like unemployment on the part of the growing youthful population, necessitating the formation of political vigilante groups as well. These causative factors influence the easy mobilisation of the youth by political elites. In simple terms, when the motives of the various individuals are coupled with such causative factors of political vigilantism, political elites are able to mobilize the youth into political vigilante groups effortlessly whereas the youth on the other hand, are compelled easily and willingly to accept to join such political vigilante groups
For example, according to Mehler (2004) one of the causative factors that necessitate the formation of political vigilante groups is the limited state capacity or structural weakness. The structural theorists support this view by claiming that the failure on the part of social and political institutions results in the formation of political vigilante groups (Faleti, 2006). The horizontal inequality theorists further maintained that the presence of cultural differences, economic and political differences and other forms of inequality among groups can serve as factors for political vigilantism (Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin, 2002). Stewart, Holdstock and Jarquin (2002) backed this by making it glaring that the presence of severe social, economic and political inequalities coinciding with institutional failure makes it easier for political elites to mobilise youth in the form of political vigilante groups to perpetuate violence.
The youth bulge theorists like Hendrixson (2004) simply puts it that a society with a growing youthful population unmatched by available jobs gives room for the formation of groupings like political vigilante groups. Impliedly, political elitists form political vigilante groups by mobilising youth who are victimized by political and economic exclusions, injustice, poverty, exploitation, unemployment and other structural conditions with the promise of giving them the afore mentioned should they help them attain political power. In this study, the focus point of analysis is on the strategies used by the political vigilante groups and their effects on human security. Political vigilante groups make use of both non-violent and violent strategies. It is depicted from the framework that there is a relationship between political vigilantism and human security since the use of both violent and non-violent strategies have effects on human security or human insecurity. The failure to address the violent acts of political vigilante groups brings about negative repercussions on human security, hence a major human insecurity factor.
In terms of health security, their violent acts can cause chronic health disorders like disability and psychological stress on the part of individuals. Also, with regards to personal security, their violent acts can result in death and the mere presence or actions of political vigilantes put individuals in state of fear and panic. The political security of individuals and their community security are also threatened as it has the proclivity to disenfranchise people and create insecurity for individuals and their properties in general. There is disruption of commercial activities, distortions in the sources of income of individuals, poverty and losing of jobs due to the actions of political vigilantes which negatively affects an aspect of human security known as economic security.
The political vigilante groups also employ non-violent strategies and undertake non-violent acts that have mild positive effects on human security which are mostly on the part of the members of such groups and the politicians. Succinctly, if political vigilantes are not engaged in violence but are into non-violent acts, in terms of community security, they act as agents for the provision of security for properties and individuals and the protection of individual lives of politicians and residents in general. They also help to enforce some electoral laws and ensure the electoral successes of their political parties among others which are relevant for political security which is an aspect of human security. It is also positive to economic security since it has been a source of income for the political vigilantes and become means of by which such people readily get employments.
Using an adapted version of Galtung’s (1969) work on violence, the work suggests that violence occurs when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. Galtung (1969) noted that the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence is referred to as personal or direct violence, and that, the type of violence where there is no such actor is structural or indirect violence. He further observed that since the direct violence are often built into the social structures of the society such as politics, it is better to focus on the bigger picture revealed by structural violence as this would reveal the causes of the violence and the conditions for sustainable peace and sustainable development. For this particular framework, the violent acts which are committed by the political vigilante group members obviously entails direct violence, where the consequences of their violent roles on human security can be traced back to concrete persons as actors who committed them.
Consequently, this direct violence committed by these political vigilante people is built into the political structure of the society and has become an integral part of the society. The structural nature which the direct violence has evolved into makes the acts appear normal especially to the perpetrators and their financiers. Ultimately, by following the work described above, one can understand the effects of political vigilantism on the human security of people.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed related literature on political vigilantism and its effects on human security. Emphatically, this chapter reviewed the Horizontal Inequality Theory, Structural Conflict Theory and Youth Bulge Theory, which served as the theories that underlined the study. This chapter further covered both conceptual review and empirical review related to the study. Finally, a composite conceptual framework was designed based on the reviewed theories and concepts, to guide the study.

Research methods
This chapter presents and further discusses the research procedures that were employed for the study. The chapter starts with the discussion of the research design and further provides information on the study area. The sampling procedures and methods of data collection are further discussed. The chapter ends with the discussion of the ethical issues that guided the research.
Research Design
The choice of a specific research design for a particular study is based on the purpose of the study (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). This study examined political vigilantism and its effects on human security in the Kumasi metropolis using a qualitative approach, underlined by the interpretivist philosophy. Considering the nature of the topic, the explorative design was deemed relevant to help arrive at rich detailed descriptions of political vigilantism and its negative repercussions on the human security of residents in the Kumasi metropolis, from the direct point of view of respondents (Creswell, 2003). The explorative design involves tackling problems on which little or no previous research has been done and that it allows for the collection of data which may be used to appraise current practices and conditions in relation to a problem, so as to come out with knowledgeable strategies aimed at improving on them (Stebbins, 2001).

Study Area
The Kumasi Metropolis was selected for the study because it is a metropolis that hosts pro NDC and NPP political vigilante groups, it has a constituency that has gained notoriety as an electoral hotspot with political vigilantes engaged in violence (Asamoah, 2020; CODEO, 2017; Ghana Police Service, 2020). According to a report by the Ghana police Service which was reviewed on the 4th of November, 2020 the Kumasi metropolis has been one of the major electoral hot spots in Ghana’s elections (Ghana Police Service, 2020). The Kumasi Metropolis is also a cosmopolitan consisting of diverse people from different ethnic groups, different educational and literacy background as well as different social background and ideologies that influence them in defending their ethnic groups among others (Schildkrout, 2006). The population of Kumasi Metropolis is 1,730, 249 and it represents 36.2 percent of the total population of the Ashanti Region which is 4,780,380. Also, about 66.5 percent of the population aged 15 years and older is economically active while 33.5 per cent is economically inactive. However, out of the economically active population, 91.4 percent is employed while 8.6 percent is unemployed (GSS, 2012). Thus, although, there are 1,156,647 persons aged 15 years and older who constitute the working age group, in Kumasi metropolis just about two-thirds, which is 769,381 of these persons are economically active. This shows that regardless of the fact that the Kumasi Metropolis has a youthful population considering its broad base population pyramid, which tapers off with a small number of elderly persons thus those from 60 years and older, some of the active youths are unemployed till date making them susceptible tools for political vigilantism (GSS, 2012).
Wholesale and retail trading as well as the repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles industries employ majority (38.4%) of the working population in the Kumasi Metropolis. Notable areas in the Metropolis where these people conduct their economic activities include Kumasi Central Market, Adum Shopping Center, Asafo, Bantama , Asafo magazine and Oforikrom markets to mention a few. The manufacturing industry is the second largest (13.6%) employer of the working population in the Kumasi metropolis. It comprises multinational companies, medium scale and micro small-scale industries in the field of brewery, food processing, leather works, craft works, fashion design and furniture works (GSS, 2012). Kumasi metropolis is centrally located in the Ashanti Region of Ghana, in the transitional forest zone and at approximately 270 km north of the national capital, Accra. It has a surface area of approximately 214.3 square kilometers which is about 0.9 percent of the Ashanti Region’s land area (GSS, 2012). It is found between Latitude 6.35° N and 6.40° S and Longitude 1.30° W and 1.35° E and elevated 250 to 300 meters above sea level. It also accommodates about 36.2 percent of the Ashanti region’s population.

Study Area Map

The Kumasi Metropolis is made up of nine sub-metros which are Asokwa sub-metro, Bantama sub-metro, Kwadaso sub-metro, Manhyia sub-metro, Nhyiayeso sub-metro, Oforikrom sub-metro, Suame sub-metro, Subin sub-metro and Tafo sub-metro. Kumasi Metropolis is known as the primary stronghold of NPP, but with the NDC winning the seats in Asawase since its inception till date, making the metropolis an electoral hotspot (Lindberg & Morrison, 2005; Jockers, Kohnert & Nugent, 2010; Brierley & Ofosu, 2014). The NDC has maintained the seats in Asawase constituency since the constituency was created in 2004. till date such that, according to the report by the Electoral Commission Ghana (EC-Ghana) in the 2012 presidential elections for instance, the NDC received 45,178 votes representing 58.78 percent of the vote in the Asawase constituency where Asawase is, whereas the NPP received 3,260 which was 40.67 percent. In terms of the Parliamentary results too, NDC’s Candidate had 43,917 votes which equals 58.25 percent while the NPP’s candidate had 31,013 representing 41.14 percent of the vote cast (EC, 2012).
The NDC again won their seats in this constituency in the 2016 general elections too according to EC-Ghana, where for the presidential election, NDC received 39,363 votes representing 53.69 percent of the vote in the Asawase constituency where Asawase is, whereas the NPP received 33,108 which was 45.16 percent. The Parliamentary results too, showed that NDC’s Candidate had 39,095 votes which equals 53.40 percent while the NPP’s candidate had 33,490 representing 45.75 percent of the vote cast (EC, 2016). These voting patterns are very common in the Asawase constituency which remains the only seat won by the NDC in the Kumasi metropolis, a notable stronghold of the NPP till now (Gyampo, Lodge & Appah, 2018).
The Kumasi Metropolis is also an ethnically diverse area with the largest ethnic group being the Asante (80.7%), a sub-group of the larger Akan ethnic group. This is followed distantly by the Mole Dagbon (8.7%) and Ewe (3.6%) but almost all the other ethnic groups in Ghana are resided in the Metropolis (GSS, 2012). These ethnic dimensions have influenced the outcome and voting patterns in elections in the Kumasi metropolis, making the area an electoral flash point, giving room for several political vigilante groups who continually use violence, which is detrimental to the human security of residents. The Asantes and other Akan ethnic groups in the area predominantly belong to the NPP, whereas the other minority ethnic groups and the Mole Dagbon are primarily NDC supporters (Amankwaah, 2013; Ayee, 2017; Jockers, Kohnert & Nugent, 2010; Schildkrout, 2006).
The residents in suburbs of Kumasi metropolis like Nhyiayeso, Asawase, Aboabo, Oforikrom and Bantama amongst others have already experienced violence undertaken by political vigilante groups. In Asawase, there was a major violent clash between political vigilantes during 2015 Parliamentary by-elections held in the metropolis (CODEO, 2017). Residents in the aforementioned areas have suffered from series of violence, torture, threats, intimidation, fear and panic, inequality, destruction of properties and its associated heightened tensions that impinge on their human security due to political vigilantism (National Peace Council, 2020).
Based on available records/reports from CODEO in 2017 and 2021, electoral areas of Asawase and Bantama constituted the epicenter of political vigilantism in the Kumasi Metropolis. Among the violence recorded in these areas is the feud between NPP and NDC in the 2015 bye-elections held in the Asawase. Asawase and Bantama are epicenters of political vigilantism because they are high electoral hotspots in Kumasi metropolis and they are also the strongholds of the NDC and NPP respectively (Amankwaah, 2013; Ghana Police Service, 2020).

Target Population
The target population for the study was categorised into three groups as follows: members of some political vigilante groups, residents above 18 years and key informants from Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom. These key informants were former political executives of NPP and NDC that have over the years resorted to the services of political vigilantes for electoral duties. The second category was made up of representatives of the police service, NCCE, Media and the district assembly. The third category consisted of current key political executives from the NPP and NDC within Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom.
Sampling Procedure
Sampling procedure is a detailed description of the processes followed to arrive at the study sample (Babbie & Baxter, 2004). The convenience sampling procedure was used to select 54 residents from Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom. Male and female residents of these three sub-areas who were above 18 years and with in-depth knowledge on political vigilantism were conveniently sampled for the study.
The purposive sampling procedure was used to select representatives from the Ghana police service, district assembly, NCCE, political executives from the NDC and NPP as well as two representatives from the media. The rationale for purposively sampling the above respondents was based on their experiences with such political vigilante groups. Media persons from Love FM and Zuria FM were purposively sampled. The media persons selected from Love FM was the host of the political morning shows at the station and had reported on elections in Kumasi since 2008. The respondent from Zuria FM was a news editor with in-depth knowledge on elections in the metropolis.
The snowball sampling technique was used to select ten political vigilantes from Asawase and Bantama. This was done by way of the researcher reaching out to some known executives of these political vigilante groups who in effects helped the researcher to get access to other members too. These other members then directed the researcher to other political vigilante members and assisted the researcher in explaining the research to such people who intend willingly accepted to speak to the researcher at their convenience. The researcher ended the collection of data from such political vigilante group members when saturation was reached.

Sources of Data
Both primary and secondary sources of data were used for the study. The primary data was obtained from members of some political vigilante groups, residents above 18 years and key informants from Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom, representatives of the media, representatives of NCCE, representatives of the Ghana police service and district assembly as well as key political executives from the NPP and NDC within Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom.
On the other hand, reports and documents from the electoral commission of Ghana, the Ghana Police Service, relevant journal articles, election observer groups, books, and manuscripts constituted the secondary data that were used to complement the primary data.
Data Collection Methods and Instruments
Interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were the main data collection methods used for the study. The interview and focus group discussion guides allowed vigilantes, residents and key informants to share their experiences on political vigilantism. The interview guide was used to collect in-depth responses from the key informants. As observed by Yin (2003), the interview guide offers guidance in relation to what to do or say next as a researcher after the interviewee is done answering the last question. In the course of undertaking the interview, note taking was done to capture the responses from the respondents. The interview was mostly conducted in Twi and in English and on the average lasted for 45-90 minutes.
FGDs were used to collect data from residents of the selected study sites who are affiliated to the NPP and NDC. A total of six FGDs were conducted in the three selected sub-areas of Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom. The FGDs usually lasted for an average of two hours with the discussions done in Twi and in English.

Data Processing and Analysis
The field data were transcribed verbatim from tape recordings unto computers for analysis. The transcribed data was cleaned, edited and arranged into themes based on the objectives of the study. The data was however analysed thematically in line with the research objectives. Thematic analysis is concerned with examining a text or document with the aim of identifying common themes that happens repeatedly. The researcher analysed the data by way of employing the coding process. Coding was used by the researcher in generating various themes. These themes appeared as the major findings of the study and intend appeared under separate headings in the findings section.

Ethical Issues
Ethics involves conforming to generally acceptable standards as well as being consistent with agreed principles of moral conduct (Gregory, 2003). The study complied with the ethical concerns and code of ethics of the University of Cape Coast. As part of the ethical procedures, an introductory letter was collected from the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Cape Coast before the data collection commenced. The assumption is that an introductory letter was relevant since the respondents did not know much, or better still, if anything about the purpose of the study.
With the introductory letter, the respondents got to know who the researcher was while the intentions for the informed consent was sought from the respondents too. This was achieved by informing them of the nature and the objectives of the study, based on which they willingly accepted to participate and to offer relevant information to the study. The essence of informed consent was to allow the participants to make an informed and voluntary decision to participate in the study.
Respondents were also assured of their right to privacy. Right to privacy was respected by way of ensuring that respondents who were unwilling to respond to some questions or divulge certain information were unconditionally excused from doing so.
Moreover, the study respected respondents’ rights to anonymity. It was further explained that real names of respondents were to be withheld and were not to be attached to any report from the study. Where necessary, pseudo names were used to represent respondents. However, respondents’ positions or offices were used as and when necessary. Finally, respondents were fully accorded their right to confidentiality. Information disclosed by respondents were used by the researcher for academic purpose only and not for any other purposes.

Results and Discussions
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study after analysing the field data. The focus of the study was to explore political vigilantism and its effects on human security in Kumasi Metropolis. The analysis of the data gathered from the interview guide and the focus group discussion guide were done using thematic analysis. The results and discussions are orderly presented in accordance with the objectives of the study.

Demographic Characteristics of the political vigilante members
This section discusses the demographic characteristics of the political vigilante groups which are the focus of the study. The characteristics reviewed are gender, age, marital status, education, and religion. The members of the vigilante groups interviewed for the study were all males with their ages ranging between 21 and 35. Furthermore, seven of them were married, four were single. This confirms the notion that single male youths dominate political vigilante groups in Ghana (Asekere, 2020).
Out of the ten political vigilante group members that were interviewed, 8 of them had no formal education whereas the other two were Junior High School certificate holders, which affirms that the illiterates were predominant in such groups. As specified by Bob-Milliar (2014) the youth who are the majority when it comes to those who form the core base of the party foot-soldiers and political vigilante groups have below average educational qualification or none.
In terms of the occupation of the respondents, seven of them were unemployed with the remaining three engaged in artisanship, depicting that the unemployed are the majority in such political vigilante groups. With respect to religion, seven of the ten political vigilantes were Muslims, two were Christians whereas the other did not indicate any faith.

Motives for Participating in Political Vigilantism
The study explored individual motivation for joining political vigilante groups. As shown in the narratives of the respondents, the motivation for joining vigilante groups were mixed, with economic reasons being the predominant factor. The motives for which people join political vigilante groups includes the livelihood concerns, jobs, income, recognition within the party, personal traits among others.
The economic motives centred on livelihood. The political vigilantes indicated that they joined the groups because it offered them the opportunity to make a livelihood and through that earn income to support themselves. For example, in an interview with a political vigilante member, he mentioned that many of them are without jobs and so they see membership of a political vigilante group as a means of earning some income to support themselves (Interview with a Political Vigilante, 15/03/2020). According to the Political Vigilantes, group membership offered them the opportunity to survive the untold hardships they go through daily. As stated by a respondent, “most of the boys in the community without jobs are perpetually prepared to join political vigilante groups to work for the politicians. In fact, joining these groups is the only means to stop depending on your family relations and friends to make some small money for yourself” (Interview with a Political Vigilante, 15/03/2020).

Similarly, it was evident in the study that many of the political vigilante members perceived the group as a conduit for getting a formal employment with any of the security institutions of the state. Members of the vigilante group were of the view that being a member of the group provided them with the opportunity to secure a job with the military, police, fire service, prisons or immigration service (Interview with a Political Vigilante, 15/03/2020). This assertion was confirmed by all the respondents, and it further came out evidently in the FGD.
Other interviews confirm this position. For example, the officer from the NCCE states that the prime motive that drive many individuals, especially the youth, to join these political vigilante groups is the opportunity for jobs, and possible recruitment into other security agencies when their political parties come to power. According to Attuquayefio and Darkwa (2017) in the last decade recruitments into the police depend on knowing a person who has political connections. The so-called people with political connections are dominated by political party elites which makes participation in these vigilante groups very necessary to catch the eye of these elites. Consequently, individuals join these political vigilantes’ groups and invest resources, time, and energy in the activities of the group with the hope of reaping political, economic, and social benefits if the party they support gains power (Norman, 2019).
People are of inimitable faith that whenever these politicians win elections, they get enormous power and in effect control more resources, as such they trust these politicians can give them access to such resources and jobs if they put up unflagging contributions towards the electoral success of these politicians by joining political vigilante groups. The motivation to join the political vigilante groups is therefore as a result of their belief to secure jobs from the politicians and to stand the chance of earning some income too (Interview with a political vigilante group members, 25/03/2020).
Party loyalty, commitment to political party and recognition motivate individuals to join political vigilante groups. The need for recognition was also dominant in the narratives as a key motive for individuals joining the group. In an interview with a male official at the Oforikrom District Assembly, it was evident that recognition by the constituency party executives and other notable party persons drives people to join a political vigilante groups. He mentioned that, some Political vigilantes who were very active and vocal in the group during the electioneering period were recognized and rewarded with certain positions in government. This gives the people the impeccable inspiration that they can easily get rewarded by way of first joining a political vigilante group and secondly, working hard for the group to get their party into power.
Political vigilante groups of both parties use violence as a way of getting recognition and to progress in their political parties. This was affirmed by a political vigilante leader that acknowledged in an interview that:
We do all sorts of violent acts with the idea that we would make our politicians feel we are seriously working for them. These days we even use social media as a way of reporting to the politicians, when we can create violence to the extent that it would be all over the place, on the news and social media platforms, then our money increases too. That is, the more the politicians feel we have hurt, killed, or vandalized, the more money we are paid, and the more our efforts are seen. The operation is in such a way that the more dangerous your acts are the more your money; violence is the measure of the weight of our work by the politicians (13/04/2020).
He further added that:
Anytime we are brought to the field to do something we know the public and cameras are on us so each one of us want to do something serious so that he would be seen as doing the most, we all want to show that we are working, we would commit the worse violent act just to earn more from the politicians. So sometimes we get hold of one person and all of us about twenty of us would attack him so that each of us would earn some praise for our efforts. Even if the violence can be done by one person all of us want to hit you so that our names would be mentioned for some credit from our leaders (13/04/2020).

Others join political vigilante groups because of peer pressure or their association with some individuals who already belong to these political vigilante groups. Citizens who participated in the FGDs were of the view that majority of the youth in the metropolis have joined these political vigilante groups all because their colleagues are members. According to a respondent, there are some youth who are members of these groups because they were invited by their friends who are already members. In order to feel accepted by their colleagues they eagerly complied and joined these political vigilante groups. To my utter shock, the youth notably the muscular ones view the joining of political vigilante groups as a way of keeping up with close associates (Interview, 26/03/2020).
Individual physique serves as an attraction to be invited to join a vigilante group. Political vigilante groups use violence as a political tool which is a very physical activity requiring the embodied presentations of self. Therefore, the enrolment of people who are either well-built or have the penchant to use violence are very necessary for the functioning of political vigilante groups. Interviews suggested that within the Kumasi metropolis, people who are well-built and are naturally violent join political vigilante groups to always commit violence, especially during the electioneering period. Such people are motivated to join the political vigilante groups since the group can serve as an avenue where they can hide to commit various nefarious acts as a way of contributing to the success of their political party (Interview, 13/04/2020).
The responses revealed that the motivation for joining political vigilante is shaped by economic and social factors. The responses further made it very lucid that economic factor is the principal factor that motivates people to join political vigilante groups as it has been affirmed by the respondents. The responses also clarified that employment and income are the two main economic motivation factors. These findings re-enforce the points raised by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2004) who argued that the quest for favours particularly economic resources by people, influences their decision to belong to political vigilante groups. They further noted that people are keen to join political vigilante groups because they are of the conviction of gaining some personal favour in return for their efforts usually finance among others. This also substantiates the assertion of Robinson and Verdier (2013) who were of the notion that the quest for jobs, income and other personal gains which are viewed as conferred on political elites by power serves as a motivation factor for which people join political vigilante groups.
As posited by Daddieh and Bob-Milliar (2012) the activities of political vigilante groups are based on the notion of reciprocity and the provision of personalised goods, such that people join the political vigilante groups as a result of some motivation factors. They further postulated that individuals are pushed by lots of motives to join political vigilante groups such that they view the joining of political vigilante groups as means to work strenuously in winning power for their political elites.
Strategies used by Political Vigilante Groups
The study examined the strategies that are used by political vigilante groups to pursue their objectives. The responses revealed that the political vigilante groups of the two major political parties in Ghana are all sophisticated in terms of the strategies used with violence as the main tool. Interviews with the different category of respondents revealed that both the NPP and the NDC political vigilante groups are armed and use sophisticated weapons as well as rudimentary ones such as machetes and knifes in their operations.
Interviews with the executive of the NDC, and NPP as well as other key informants revealed that Political vigilantes use unlicensed guns on them on a daily and can shoot to kill at any time. They possess weapons of this nature based on the perilous nature of the strategies used in attaining their set goals such as the destruction of properties, subjecting people to injury, shootings, and killings in some cases. This assertion was confirmed by a political vigilante who noted that they use arms and machetes in their activities. This according to him, was underpinned by the desire to create fear using violence.
In other interviews, members of the political vigilante groups affirmed that they live in a constant state of fear as they anticipate that their rivals will attack them. A respondent stated that “since their opponents are also aggressive in their approach, political vigilantes always walk prepared, even on days that we do not go for operations we do not walk without our pistols and the like” (Interview, 15/03/2020).
Another strategy was the use of charms provided by fetish priest to make them invincible to their colleagues and opponents. These charms provided energy and strength and other mystical powers to the members of the vigilante groups. This was confirmed by a political vigilante group member.
I would say that most of my colleagues are very powerful in the sense that they have certain talisman and other spiritual backings which make them fearless and bold. We always see ourselves as targets who can be subjected to shootings and all that at any time, so we are under the spell of some fetish spirit for our personal protection (Interview, 12/04/2020).

The issue of drug use came out strongly in the narratives of vigilante groups and citizens. In the FGD, it came out strongly that most of the political vigilantes operate under the influence of hard drugs. The use of hard drugs to perpetrate violence, reduces remorse and sense of guilt among the political vigilantes. According to a vigilante group member:
After abusing drugs such as heroine we feel the urge to do whatever is asked of us by our leaders. Some of us when we are operating, we can hurt, manhandle you and even kill in the course of duties, there are some of us who would not stop our actions till we see blood, since we are under the influence of hard drugs and fetish powers. We would take no explanations and would not listen to anything when we take those drugs; this is our only source of making some small amount to go and buy hard drugs and others, so you dare not stand our way, the least threat therefore triggers violent confrontations from us (Interview, 15/03/2020)

A political vigilante member similarly noted in an interview that they are sophisticated in their approach to the extent that, aggressiveness is also used as a means of ensuring their promises; grievances and needs are fulfilled by the politicians. He briefly stated that:
We are often violent in the course of demanding what is due us after working so hard to bring the party to power because, that is the only language the politicians understand, if you stay harmless, they would never give you your own share of the cake, but do something violent and they would take your needs into consideration without hesitation just to avoid disgrace. The only time they give us our own share of the cake after winning is when we use force or violence, there is an Akan aphorism which goes like if you stay mute, they would give you a wrong haircut, we use force, vandalize and take over public facilities among others (17/04/2020).

Again, the assertion that the political vigilante groups of the NPP and NDC are strategically sophisticated was backed by respondents who stated that, mostly when the groups clash, they engage in public confrontations where they use violence. A passionate political vigilante member affirmed that:
For some of us we even happen to come from same parents but belong to different political parties and different political vigilante groups. Thus, back at home regardless of our differences, myself, and my blood relatives in the other political party we stay peacefully. However, when we meet in groups, with each one of us representing our different political parties, we fight insistently. We can hurt ourselves while in our political groupings and without taking into accounts we are blood relatives, each one of us is working for his political party, we would get to the house before we even notice we hurt our own brothers. Anytime an NPP affiliated vigilante group clashes with an NDC affiliated vigilante group, there is violence since the two groups are all aggressive in nature (Interview, 22/03/2020).

A journalist of Zuria FM also supported this via an interview, where he noted that the groups are fond of using violence to take over state properties when their parties win elections:
The strategies used by the political vigilante groups here in Kumasi metropolis can be described with all the unpalatable adjectives such as violent, abusive, and sophisticated, even if there is any description beyond these ones, one is not far from wrong to use it for them, these people are popular for violent roles both verbally and physically which is undeniable. They are very violent, and their roles are usually devastating. Whenever their political party wins, they use force to take over toilets, toll booths and others, they attack people in their offices and throw them out, and they beat people who stand their ways too without fear of being arrested, they have become immune to jail, due to their associations with these greedy politicians (30/04/2020).
In the same manner, other respondents articulated that the NPP and NDC vigilante groups are notable for strategies that are sophisticated since these political parties go into elections thus either bye elections, primaries or general elections and any electoral related activity like voter registration exercises with the intension of bringing their parties to power at all costs whether by foul or fair means. Due to this zero-sum approach, these political vigilantes therefore take their colleagues in other parties as enemies, and that they go into such election processes prepared aggressively to meet and match equally aggressive opponents. A dedicated political vigilante member noted in an interview that:
I would say that as the security people of the political party, we ensure that we are present at all events that would have to do with our political party and our opponents such as voter registration, bye elections and others. We operate with the idea that in our strong holds we have the numbers there already so the people themselves can guarantee to safeguard our electoral success. We therefore send our men to strong holds of our opponents fully prepared to match our equally violent opponents in same regard, with the aim of ensuring that even if we would lose there, our opponents would not win with higher margin. So, we go there to do things that would cause low voter turnout at such places which call for aggressive strategies (17/04/2020).
A political vigilante member in an interview also admitted that:
As political vigilante group members, one of our roles is to create riot at the stronghold of our opponents so that electorates out of fear and panic would not come out to vote causing low turnout. We meet secretly, map out negative strategies to go and put-up violent acts that would disrupt the elections in the strongholds of our opponents, so that the fans of our opponents cannot come out and vote for them, we can go any mile including snatching of ballot boxes at such place, we prepare aggressively because we are aware our opponents are aggressive too (28/03/2020).
In the same manner, respondents avowed that the vigilante groups of the NPP and NDC are sophisticated, pointing out to the trainings they undergo in the hide out in preparation for elections. An ardent vigilante member for instance said:
One would see us as mere civilians and individuals with no trainings, but we are an army or military men on our own, we have all the trainings you can think of mostly in preparations towards elections. Even as of now that the politicians claim they have disbanded our groups due to the newly enacted laws on political vigilantism, they have come to pick some of our brothers who are in the hide out for this special security trainings. They were taken in batches of 200 people from this zongo area, and they will be there for two-month training. This is the fourth batch of 200 people going for this training so just multiply 200 by four that is almost 800; of course, there would be extra batches that would go for the training before the next elections. It should tell you how serious the group is (18/04/2020).

An enthusiastic vigilante member also noted that:
For those of us in the NDC, we know the country is currently on a time bomb because we are aware that the NPP vigilantes are training, and we suspect they have the view that even if they lose the next elections they would never give it out easily. Our men are therefore seriously training and fully preparing ourselves to face these people come next elections. So long as they would take their boys for training, we from the NDC too would send our boys for training, so long as they would maintain some ex-political vigilante guys in the state security apparatus, we would do same. Let us wait for the next elections to get the clear picture as to whether the groups are still there or not (13/04/2020).
Also, an ex-political executive of Asawase confirmed that:
I know these boys are given some security trainings, two of my cousins, well built, have not been in the house for some months now, they have been taken to a place far away for security trainings. I called them few days ago; they confessed they are being taken through series of tedious security trainings. I learnt the trainings are in preparation towards the next elections, so they go through security trainings, it is never a mere speculation (17/04/2020).
Again, respondents corroborated by bringing forth the view that the NPP and NDC political vigilantes are sophisticated to the extent that they have huge members and followers both within the regional levels and various constituencies across the country. In line with this a vigilante member stated that:
We are many; we have huge numbers. In Kumasi metropolis alone, if I am not exaggerating that of my political party alone our membership is around 10,000 people. We have about 50 groups working for my political party alone in the whole of Ashanti Region. In Kumasi metropolis alone we have about 20 of the vigilante groups affiliated to my political party, with one popular politician from my political party controlling about 18 of them. So we link up with the various groups we have in other places through various modes of communication and settle on the way to carry out operations.
Also, a very passionate vigilante member observed that:
We have good relations with our brothers who have these political vigilante groups outside Kumasi metropolis that are working for our party. It is due to the good relationship among us that we can send some of our members out there to go and help our colleagues in such areas outside the metropolis during elections and other exercises linked with elections, we have our own WhatsApp group pages, and we interact there, we as well have the regional executives and branch executives communicating harmoniously using the Gotha and the like (19/03/2020).

It was also exposed by respondents that the vigilantes have direct dealings with some top politicians and members within the security apparatus that make them very powerful and sophisticated in their operations. The responses showed that because of these deep grounded social and political networks with politicians and the state security, they operate with the idea that they will never be made to face the laws if they offend. It was for instance identified that, just a simple call from these political vigilante members to the presidency and other politicians could lead to their release from the custody of the police, whereas some policemen involved in their arrest for criminal acts lost their jobs, appointments, positions or were forced to go on transfer. It is awful to the degree that in some cases the police and other state security apparatus are unable to act dutifully when the political vigilantes are present, they are even immune to jails.
From the responses above, it can be seen without vacillation that the political vigilante groups in Kumasi metropolis are sophisticated in terms of strategies. The respondents posited clearly that the political vigilante groups of NPP and NDC are strategically sophisticated. Although, the politicians interviewed were not willing to disclose that the political vigilante groups used aggressive strategies making them sophisticated, the other respondents opened and brought to bear that the political vigilante groups are violent in their approach. The researcher even observed that most of the vigilantes appeared for the interviews armed, which affirmed the degree to which they were sophisticated in their approach. This is in line with the study by Bob-Milliar (2012) which notes that political vigilante groups are known for contributing to or perpetrating violence in the strongholds of their opponents during elections and its related activities based on clearly cut-out sophisticated strategies.

Sources of Financing for Political Vigilante Groups
To undertake the set strategies of political vigilante groups, it requires some financing as well as some income to encourage members of such groups, as such this aspect of the study sought to find out the way the means and sources of funding of political vigilante groups are done and the ones who fund such groups. The responses depicted that the NPP and the NDC did not accept the fact that the political vigilante groups are officially owned by their political parties. Instead, they admitted that, albeit the fact that they are not officially recognized wings of these political parties, individual politicians within these two major political parties go in for their services and as a result finance their activities. Kanyadudi (2010) asserted that political vigilante groups are not substantially and officially integrated into their parent political party structures, but they continue to work in the interest of individual politicians and the political parties. An executive of the NPP, Bantama illustrated in an interview that:
These are people we know and all that, we even stay in same houses with some of them, but they are not recognised as a wing by the party, so we engage them and pay them, but we do not see them as an official wing of the party. Within our party structures we do not have an officially recognised wing called a political vigilante group like invisible force, we have wings like women wings, youth wings and others, and I can state authoritatively that political vigilante group is not one of such officially recognised wings of our political party. In terms of finance, since we do not recognise these groups officially all I can say is the party has not allocated amounts for their roles like we do for the other officially recognised wings but like I said they know some of us who are their party executives. They walk to us individually for financial help when they are going to take an action on behalf of the party, which we sometimes do out of our own will, it is not mandatory. So, they are paid by individual politicians and not from the coffers of the party (13/04/2020).
A Ghana police officer also opined in an interview that:
They do not undertake their roles for free; they take some income in return for their contributions to the various political parties. They are paid by the politicians in the two major political parties who hire them for specific jobs. Usually, the politicians want to appear faceless, but I have heard names of some high profiled politicians who sponsor such people financially. For their sources of finance, I can boldly say it is from the politicians, mostly from the national level, so they have local and area heads that act as intermediaries between the political vigilante group members and the politicians. The national politicians give the money to their local political representatives who share this money among the political vigilante group members (30/04/2020).
It was alluded by respondents that individual politicians finance the activities of these vigilantes because even in cases where violent muscular men, put themselves together and are not necessarily tied up to any political party, the NPP or NDC politicians go in for such people to be used in executing violence and pay them. The well-to-do politicians in the NPP and the NDC sponsor violent but loyal party foot soldiers that put themselves together to show their commitments for these parties by way of undertaking violent electoral roles. There were also responses depicting that the politicians themselves mobilise and pay some individuals to offer them private security and to be used for violent duties of this kind. The argument was further broadened by respondents who noted that one of the ways by which the individual politicians sponsor these vigilantes is by way of the incumbents recruiting such vigilantes into the state security apparatus with the motive that they can earn some income and in return supervise or undertake aggressive electoral roles on their behalf when the need be. For example, an avid vigilante stated in an interview that:
For some time now the incumbent political parties unlawfully put us on Government pay rolls as workers in some public institutions that per our qualifications we cannot in any way afford to work there. For example, under the NPP some of us are on teacher and nurses’ pay roll among others. We are therefore entitled to monthly stipends. When the NDC was in power there were some of my brothers who were also not teaching but they used to go for their own salary since they were also illegitimately enrolled unto the pay roll of the Ghana Education Service. There are some of our members too who were recruited into the national security and other state outfits, they got what is dubbed as job for the boys to earn money. For example, there are some of our members who have been recruited into the state security apparatus and forestry commission to mention a few; they are cheerfully earning some stipends and salaries (17/04/2020).

On the other hand, there were also responses pointing out to the fact that these political vigilantes received their funding by way of engaging in other criminal acts too. In an interview with a policeman, he articulated that:
These people do not pay dues, they do not do fund raising so when the politicians are not giving them the money they deserve, they use other means like engaging in landguardism, armed robbery and the like for money. They know that, even if they are arrested during such acts they would still be saved by their messiahs, the politicians, who holds the power to get them freed from jails. On weekends, they are night club bouncers, on weekdays they visit the gym and sleep whole day, to earn income they use their body for landguardism, armed robbery and other social vices (30/04/2020).

From the responses obtained, it is explicit that the political vigilante groups are funded by the politicians who engage such people and that their financing is not done directly from the general coffers of the political parties. This confirms the study done by Edigin (2010) which notes that powerful individuals who determine who, what, when, and how things operate and are usually in the corridors of power known as godfathers usually popular politicians are the undercurrents to the formation of political vigilante groups in Ghana. These political godfathers build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate them. These godfathers offer their support to these political vigilante groups mainly through financing, providing vehicles, political cover amongst others.
In summary, this aspect of the study has arrived at the fact that the political vigilante groups that are affiliated to both the NPP and the NDC in the Kumasi metropolis are very sophisticated as far as their strategies are concerned. This according to responses is since they are armed; aggressive, use illicit drugs and that some even operate under the spell of fetishism. It has also been confirmed that they are embedded in networks with the politicians and security agencies as well as very notable for violent confrontations and other acts of semblance that make them strategically sophisticated. In terms of financing, It has been realised through the study that, the political vigilante groups in Kumasi metropolis get their sources of finance mainly from individual politicians that resort to their services and where the politicians are not sponsoring them with money they use other illegal means to get money such as engaging in armed robbery, landguardism and other social vices.

Effects of Political Vigilantism on Human Security of Residents
This objective was to explore the effects of the presence and actions of political vigilante groups on the human security of residents. All the respondents mentioned that the actions of political vigilante groups pose negative threats to the human security of individuals in Kumasi metropolis. They stated that the use of violence, intimidation, assaults, arson, gunshots, vandalization of properties and violence in general, negatively affected the economic security of individuals by way of causing a halt in commercial activities, disrupting businesses and other sources of income of residents, and even causing individuals to become poor.
During the interviews with the respondents, it was clear that whenever the political vigilantes engaged in violence in this area residents do not open their shops due to fear. and sell in such an environment borne out of fear, these political vigilante guys have even taken advantage of such scenes too to loot shops and collapse people’s businesses here, I recall the foul-tasting ordeal of how they looted my wife’s shop during a squabble among these political vigilante groups here which lasted for number of weeks, my wife had to stay at home for a while without opening the shop, our source of income as a family was all gone, we were met with loads of wants (17/04/2020).An official at the Bantama District Assembly supported the above by clearly lamenting in an interview that:
People need safety environment to be able to go about their businesses and so where I reside for instance, in 2012 when the NDC won the general elections attempts by some Pro-NDC vigilantes to take over certain public offices in Bantama, led to melee between these political vigilantes and the people of this area, we the people were unable to go about with our businesses peacefully. I remember because of that brawl, my own boutique and that of my neighbors here were shut down for number of days. The guys operating it for me, complained that they feared to go and open the shop, I lost some amount in the course. It was a bitter pill to swallow, if I recount the extent to which they attacked innocent people randomly, their actions sent some fear on the part of we the residents, movements were curtailed, because as of the time we did not know our faith as to when we were going to be attacked or beaten (26/03/2020).

In the FGD with residents of Asawase one major concern was the sacking of people known to be associated with a political party right after the elections when there is a change in government. They mentioned the use of force, intimidation, and violence to take over public offices which were being managed by their political opponents. These take overs after a change in government by agents of the party that won the elections are usually violent during resistance. Both the NPP and NDC party political vigilantes were accused of such violent behaviour.

From the responses political vigilantism poses a negative threat to the health security of individuals by way of making residents victims through injury and loss of life. In an interview with a local government official, it was recounted that:
The actions of political vigilantes are violent, they employ potent weapons like machetes in their line of duty as such their attacks come with sickening scenes like individual limbs being severed from their torsos, hacked, pierced bodies and other physical forms of abuse which come with health implications and higher cost involved in curing injuries and the kind. Some innocent people from this area had been hospitalised in the past because of injury, wounds among others inflicted on them by some vigilantes. I wish I could take you to the house of a member of one of the political parties who is paralysed till date because of a violence that ensued between him and some political vigilantes, simply because he had refused giving them the keys to a public latrine here (15/04/2020).
There were also responses endorsing the idea that political vigilantism in the metropolis have had negative impact on political security since their acts like intimidations, repressions and others have disenfranchised people and resulted in conflicts at some polling stations in the metropolis before. A police official confirmed this assertion by educing in an interview that:
The actions of these bloodthirsty beings having devil’s pact with the politicians pose severe threat to the political security of individuals here, sometimes even to people within their own political party whom they are working for. There have been records of intra party conflicts spearheaded by these vigilante groups here, where they turned against their own members or leadership and fought them due to internal political party elections like primaries in the metropolis. It is usually violence whenever these pro NPP and pro NDC political vigilantes clash here, or pounce on the people, sometimes with bloodshed, we had to intervene in some cases. I recollect that while on duty during voter registration exercises in the metropolis at Asawase, they engaged in fights, used intimidation and other means to prevent people from registering, they even created tensions at the registration centres, inconvenienced some people they assumed to be minors and those they felt had been bussed to the area, forgetting some of us were at post. As a result of such happenings, some people in Asawase were unable to come out and register in their numbers due to fear. I would not bigmouth you with the foul-tasting bye-elections which took place at Asawase sometime past, which was riddled with sporadic shootings among these political vigilantes and the way it drew sorrow and ire from some residents of Asawase, who were disenfranchised (30/04/2020).
In the same vein, in a focus group discussion held for residents in Asawase one major theme that emerged was the fact that political vigilantism in the metropolis has negative effects on political security to the extent that it has caused people not to have interests in voting exercises no more.
It was also made glaring by respondents that the actions of political vigilante groups have resulted in the death of some residents and caused individual residents to be grappled with fear, hence negatively effects personal security. In an interview with a key informant of Asawase he recounted that:
They were able to go to the court of competent jurisdiction and free their criminal members. They did this with ease and are still walking freely. Even their political party heads had to run to save their own lives because they were chased by these political vigilante members. Just few days ago, they spilled blood, they shot my own nephew at the NDC headquarters here at Asawase. As a result of this shooting, out here we even fear using that part of Asawase in the evening, which disturbs our movement. It still feels like yesterday, when I saw these people moving in groups at the headquarters on the said day, their looks, physiques, and some of the arms they carried around that day made them scary and they shot my only nephew for no reason, today he is no more who would buy food and offer the old man something small for my personal moves. The mere thought of the whole incidence is nerve-wracking and its sends shivers down my spine. If they have been able to even chase their own political masters, who recruit and fund them and shot their very own, then we are nothing like ordinary ants in their eyes, they can equally attack us and spill gallons and gallons of blood of our blood at any time, we tremble a lot at the mention of their names. It is extremely terrible (17/04/2020).
The FGDs revealed that political vigilantism has negative influence on the environmental security of residents in the form of adverse environmental depletion and other acts that have undesirable effects on the sustainability of the physical environment for both the current and future indigenes of the Kumasi metropolis. The burning of party paraphernalia and lorry tyres for instance had environmental consequences. The residents stated that the destruction of properties had environmental consequences.
On the contrary, some of the respondents held the view that political vigilantism had positive effects on the human security of residents of the metropolis, with their reasons being that political vigilantes have helped protected individuals, properties, ensured community security, helped people get jobs, social benefits and even encouraged electoral participation and electoral success of both the NPP and the NDC in the metropolis. A key informant stated that:
The actions of the political vigilante groups made it possible for some residents to register and vote peacefully. Some of these guys have been seen teaching our mothers how to vote, which helped re-ignited the confidence of some women here to go and vote without fear. Also, they have protected the ballot box in a calm manner which ensured peaceful elections devoid of rigging, leading to the NPP’s win in the 2016 general elections, back then our opponents could come and cause confusion in our strongholds but since we had these boys in place, the situation had been managed (26/03/2020).
In another interview, an NDC ex-executive of Asawase posited tersely that:
I must admit that, with the presence of political vigilante group members in this area, mothers especially those known to be supporters of NDC feel that they are protected, because so long as their brave sons are here, nobody can come from outside and trespass, that one it would never happen, they are here to show intruders from the NPP where real power lies on behalf of we the residents, they are our personal security men in this area. But for the timely intervention of these guys, some of our people would have been sacked during the voter’s registration exercise (17/03/2020).

In an interview with a zealous political vigilante member, he expressed gleefully that:
This whole thing is like the beautiful game of football, you just must do everything possible to bring your political party to power and then you enjoy the benefits associated with it. Back in opposition, I had targeted some public toilets in the area, but I had no option than to watch my colleagues from the NDC enjoy the proceeds from its management. In line with this, following the triumphant entry of my beloved NPP into the flagstaff I have personally seized two toilet facilities in this area, and I am reaping its financial benefits. I am also on Governments pay-roll as a teacher, though I am uneducated and do not teach in any school (17/03/2020).

Similarly, in the FGD, the respondents argued during the discussion that political vigilantism has gotten some positive effects on human security especially when they employ non-aggressive strategies. They revealed sharply that these positive effects are mostly on the part of the political vigilantes and their political masters, where they illustrated that because of political vigilantism some individuals have gotten employment and are managing some public avenues of income now at the expense of the opposition members. They also pointed out the extent to which political vigilante groups had been very useful in using their strength to safeguard the NPP to power and in helping NDC to even raise their number of votes in some other areas in the Kumasi metropolis aside Asawase and gave narratives indicating the social benefits such as being immune to jail and other benefits enjoyed by some political vigilantes they knew.
The above responses obtained from the focus group discussions and interviews proved that the negative effects of political vigilantism on the human security of residents outstrip the positive effects of the actions of political vigilante group members on human security of residents in the metropolis. Political vigilantism in Kumasi metropolis has heightened fear and want among the population of Kumasi, led to chronic health problems, deaths, widened inequality, caused environmental crises, disenfranchised people, and led to poverty among some individual residents in the area by distorting their economic activities and sources of income. Conversely, despite these numerous shortcomings, on the lighter note political vigilantism has positively offered the vigilantes employment, given these political vigilantes sources of income, social benefits and contributed to the political success of the NPP and NDC in this area as well as encouraged electoral participation and community security. This confirms the argument of Alkire (2003) who asserted that the key components of human security that need to be critically looked at are security from violent conflict, poverty, humanitarian crises, epidemic diseases, injustice, inequality, fear and wants. It is also in line with the UNDP report which outlined economic security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security as some of the main elements of human security (UNDP, 1994).
In summary, this aspect of the study has arrived at the fact that since the political vigilante groups of the NDC and NPP are mostly engaged in the use of sophisticated strategies and violent acts, their actions pose negative threats to political security, personal security, health security, economic security, environmental security and others by way of causing fear and want among the individuals in Kumasi metropolis, death tolls, bringing about chronic health problems, inequality, physical environmental crises and poverty on the part of the residents in the metropolis. Positively too, political vigilantism has offered the vigilantes employment, sources of income, social benefits, contributed to the political success, electoral participation and in effects inspired community security.

Managing Political Vigilantism
This objective sought to elicit information from the respondents on some means through which the issue of political vigilante groups can be managed. The study set out to identify the interventions made by some stake holders to address the issue of political vigilantism. The study then delved into whether the people saw the enactment of laws as the surest way to disband political vigilante groups.

Interventions by some Institutions in Managing Political Vigilantism
In answering questions on the various institutions that have made attempts to help in managing the issue of political vigilantism in Kumasi metropolis, respondents revealed that there have been some interventions by some state-owned institutions in the management of political vigilantism in Kumasi metropolis but have not been fully met with success. For example, the respondents mentioned that public institutions like the NCCE, the Ghana Police and Regional Security Council among others have been phenomenal in undertaking some activities meant to manage political vigilantism in Kumasi metropolis. In an interview with one NCCE official it was signified that:
For those of us here at the NCCE, our outfit goes to radio mostly on Thursdays to offer education to the public, mostly we go to Garden city radio and the television for 30 minutes to sensitize the people on political vigilantism. Whenever the NCCE goes for public gathering too we use the occasion to educate the people on political vigilantism. For those in schools, we have the civic education class where we reach out to the senior High schools take them through civic education and after wards sensitize them on political vigilantism. We emphasize in our education to these students that political vigilantism is unconstitutional, it is not good, it would ruin their future, and that they should concentrate on their education and refrain from groups of this kind. We tell the students that when a politician asks them to join such groups, they should look them in the face and ask them where their children are or better still why they would not use their children for such roles? (25/03/ 2020).

An NDC executive of Asawase also came out with the view that:
The issue has become a national problem, so it is difficult for the metropolis to work in isolation, the thinking is that once it is solved at the national level it will trickle down but within the metropolis, I have not seen any engagement by the metropolis or various sub-metro officials attempting to contact the party on such matters. However, I have heard and seen agencies like the NCCE speaking and educating people on political vigilantism within the metropolis, even with that their efforts have not been fully crowned with success in this crusade against vigilantism (27/03/2020).
The police also said that for their outfit, they could not arrest people for merely engaging in political vigilante groups or for being members of political vigilante groups since per our constitution as of the time, being a member of such a group was not a criminal act. They pointed that the only time the police intervened and made arrest of political vigilante groups in the past was for the criminal end products of their acts and not for merely being members of such groups. They explained further that, political vigilante groups were not criminal groups until the onset of this new law that criminalises political vigilantism and its related offenses. The police added that, until recent times, it was the cases that emanated from the actions of political vigilantes that were often treated as crime. As a result, they even said the only data they had on such issues were on the product of their actions such as causing harm, stealing, assaults and many others but not records of cases on political vigilantism. The police stated in an apropos way that people were arrested and charged with other criminal offences borne out of their actions and not for being members of such political vigilante groups. For example, a police officer reckon their cogent roles in the incident that happened at the NDC headquarters here in Kumasi metropolis where a political vigilante was shot recently. They acknowledged that the police intervened, apprehended these political vigilantes for assault cases or conspiracy cases and presented them before the courts.
A police officer confirmed this assertion that some interventions have been made by the Ghana police, by observing in an interview that:
The police have ensured that whenever these political vigilante members committed other crimes, they were arrested and sent to the law court for prosecution. For example, in the issue at the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC), the police helped to arrest eight persons that were involved and took them to court, only for the judges to ask them to pay small fine and go scot free. The police in Kumasi metropolis have not failed in delivering its mandate of bringing such people to book for other criminal offences (30/04/ 2020).
Accordingly, other respondents also explained that there have been some efforts from non-state actors in managing political vigilantism in Kumasi Metropolis although the vigilantism is still on the rise. It was disclosed that the private institutions engaged in the combat of political vigilantism include private media outlets, Muslim, and Christian religious leaders as well as group of muscular men who do not belong to such vigilante groups but have rather learnt to transform their energies to useful ventures. These groups of people have volunteered in innumerable ways to create awareness on political vigilantism within the metropolis.
An ex-political executive in Asawase who a key informant to the study is attested to this by sharing the opinion that:
This area is dominated by Muslims; as a result, representatives of the chief Imams do public education programmes for the youth. They have also tried to have dialogues with the leadership of the two political parties, sit them down and together come out with a road map for teaching the young ones here to come to accept themselves as one people. Again, during Friday meetings the Muslim leaders preach to the people to desist from such groups during their sermons. In the same way, we preach this same message of peace at events like funerals, naming ceremony, weddings, and others (15/03/2020).

A journalist of Zuria FM, who is a news editor, also posited that:
We continue to use our outfit thus our media to sensitize the public on political vigilantism, point out the actions of political vigilante group members to the police when the need arises and ensure we do a follow up to see if the police have gone far to redress the instances reported. Our radio station and other media houses here in Kumasi have been engaged in sensitization. For instance, on joy news TV and joy news channel as well as all the multimedia affiliated stations too I have seen some awareness creation meant to find an end to the scourge of political party vigilantism. Even on their social media platforms I have seen them use the hash tag disband vigilantism now and others. Aside the media houses, individuals are even acting as advocates in their own small way in advising the youth to avert being used for violence (30/04/2020).
An NPP executive, Bantama said in the same manner in an interview that:
There is a voluntary non-violent association of muscular men here in Kumasi that have taken it upon themselves to sensitize and teach their colleagues who are using their muscles to work as vigilante men to discontinue such acts. They do this by organising sporting activities among the muscular guys to speak to them on the consequences of hiding under the membership of political vigilante groups to commit all sorts of deviant acts (13/04/2020).

It can be seen from the responses that there has been some intervention by state owned institutions in ending political vigilantism in the metropolis and that more has been done by the state-owned institutions in the management of political vigilantism in the metropolis than that of the non-state institutions albeit the fact that the situation remains. This confirms the argument of Bellamy and Williams (2011) who stated that the State institutions such as the National Peace Council (NPC), the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) have helped managed political vigilantism by way of facilitating consultations, sensitizations, and dialogues on political vigilantism and how to reduce electoral violence in general among political parties in Ghana.
Laws on Disbandment of Political Vigilantism and Its Related Offenses
This aspect of the study considered whether the setting of new law, the vigilantism, and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999) which is meant to disband vigilante groups; including political vigilante groups and land guards; to proscribe acts of vigilantism in the country and to provide for related matters was enough to achieve an absolute disband of political vigilantism. In answering questions on whether the new law on political vigilantism and its related offenses is the way forward in ending the political vigilantism or not? The respondents opined succinctly that even though it is a laudable move to set new laws aimed at disbanding political vigilante groups, for them they believed the new laws would not achieve its goals should certain factors remain unchanged. For example, it was explained by a journalist of Zuria FM in an interview that:
If we say we are just enacting a law to disband political vigilantism and we are unable to solve the fundamental economic challenges we have in this country, we still go into elections with the winner takes all nature, politicians continue to secretly meet and assure these political vigilante people as well as continue to engage them, then the enactment of law is an exercise that is dead on arrival. I want to say that there are laws which already criminalises some of their actions, but we still see them on their numbers skyrocketed, which simply shows that we have failed when it comes to backing our words with actions, we have failed in implementing and enforcing such laws appropriately (30/04/2020).

A political vigilante member also confirmed same way that:
I think all that the Government is doing are mere pranks and lies; they have not barred our groups by just endorsing the new laws. Regardless of our huge membership, our groups are not duly registered, so if you say you are disbanding our groups using a new law, my question is how can you disband something you have no record on? Banning an anonymous group? I think that is a joke. The politicians who set these new laws are the same people who are giving us assurance that we should not worry; we have had loads of meetings with them following this latest development where they have reached consensus with us that we should still train for the next elections (12/03/2020).

On the contrary, other respondents were of the view that the laws are enough to help disband political vigilante groups. An executive of NPP, Bantama for example pointed out in an interview that:
The President has every right to state that if we do not like an act in this country it should stop and that would be adhered to, it is therefore enough that he has come out with this new law to disband political vigilantism and its related offenses since we have all given him the political power to act in matters of this nature. These new laws have come to revive the old ones; new rules have also been added, so it would work. I know that despite the violent acts these people perform they fear for their lives like any other human being so if there is a new law that makes it clear that these are the punishments you would get for doing these acts they would stay away from it, I know these new laws would help disband the political vigilante groups since it captures land guards and even the financiers of these political vigilante groups (13/04/2020).

From the responses, it is obvious that the respondents do not see the mere formation of the law thus the vigilantism and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999), by the Government as the end to political vigilantism, they were rather of the view that value should be placed on the effective enforcement of these new law and the already existing ones that criminalises the end products of the actions of these political vigilantes.
In summary, this aspect of the study has undoubtedly made it known that even though vigilantism is still alarming; political vigilantism has received attention from the part of state-owned institutions such as the NCCE, the Ghana police and other non-state actors like that from religious leaders, voluntary associations of some non-vigilante muscular men and others. In the same way, majority of the respondents have backed the claim that the enactment of the law, the vigilantism, and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999) is not enough and that it should be backed by effectual enforcement.

Resolving Political Vigilantism
Several apposite recommendations for managing political vigilante groups were made by the respondents. A broadcast journalist of Love FM called for the need for livelihood empowerment programmes, equal access to quality education and a change in the winner takes all aspect of the political system in Ghana. Some of these suggestions were re-echoed by an NCCE official. The official stated that youth should be at the centre of any intervention to eliminate political vigilantism. The National Youth Policy and other policies concerning the youth must focus on building civility among the youth and to provide them with jobs. Provision of jobs and other initiatives that will capture the attention and energy of the youth will move them away from violence and the manipulation of party elites (Interview 25/03/2020).
A key informant opinion that, political parties, especially the NPP and NDC should not utilize the services of the youth negatively for the political party activities. I think to solve or handle the issue of political vigilantism the leaders or politicians who have been engaging these people should just stop going in for their services and the thing would stop (26/03/2020).
In summary, respondents suggested that there should be the creation of jobs for the increasing youthful population, there was a call for critical look at livelihood empowerment programmes, suggestions for reforms in our governance system and a reminder to re-visit the national youth policy and implement it efficiently in order that it will benefit the youth. It was also suggested that the two major political parties in Ghana should boldly decide on not using these political vigilante groups.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented and discussed the findings obtained after analysing the field data. It was uncovered that economic, social and factors resulting from inherent traits are the main motivation for joining political vigilante groups and that economic factor stands out as the most obvious motivation. It has been discovered that politicians motivate political vigilantes by improving their status economically through direct financial assistance, employments in state outfits and sources of livelihood among others. It became evident that political vigilantes in the metropolis are very sophisticated in terms of their strategies. Thus, they are armed, aggressive, operate under the spell of fetishism, use illicit drugs and are into grounded networks made up of politicians and state security agencies. The study depicted that the political vigilantes in Kumasi metropolis get their sources of finance mainly from individual politicians that resort to their services. Political vigilantism poses severe negative threats to human security by way of causing individual fear and want, chronic health problems, physical environmental crises, poverty and widening inequality. The study revealed that political vigilantism has received intervention from state owned institutions such as the NCCE, the Ghana Police and other non-state actors such as the religious leader’s groups. It has also been made apparent through the studies that the enactment of laws is not enough to end the spate of vigilantism and that the laws should be backed by proper enforcement. The study also illustrated the need for the creation of jobs for the increasing youthful population, a call for livelihood empowerment programmes, suggestions for reforms in governance system and a critical look at the national youth policy and its implementation for improving the welfare of the youth. It was also made salient that political vigilantes can end only and when the political parties develop the political will to courageously decide not to use them again.

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
In this chapter, the significant findings and the valuable information obtained from this study have been carefully summarized. The chapter by far is made up of the summary of the research, and the conclusions drawn from this study. Also, significant recommendations for further studies were given based on the analysis done for this study. The major aim of the study was to explore political vigilantism and its effects on human security in Kumasi metropolis. To achieve this, the study placed emphasis on examining the motives for which people join political vigilante groups. Furthermore, the study ascertained the strategies used by political vigilante groups within Kumasi metropolis. In essence, the study scrutinised the effects of the actions of political vigilante groups on the human security of residents in Kumasi metropolis. The study then sought to identify ways through which political vigilantism and its related effects on human security could be managed.
The study was conducted at Bantama, Asawase and Oforikrom sub-areas in the Kumasi Metropolis. The study used an explorative design in the qualitative approach. The study targeted different category of participants including political vigilante group members, residents above 18 years and key informants; political executives from both NPP and NDC parties; representatives of the district assembly, the Ghana police service, the media as well as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). Purposive sampling, convenience sampling and snowball sampling were used in selecting different categories of participants that were involved in the study. Specifically, the purposive sampling procedure was used in sampling key informants including ex-executives of NPP and NDC from Asawase, Bantama and Oforikrom sub-areas, representative of the Ghana police service, the district assembly, NCCE, current political executives of the NDC and NPP as well as two representatives of the media. The rationale for purposively selecting the above respondents was because of their experiences with such political vigilante groups. The snowball sampling was also used in sampling ten political vigilante group members to be interviewed. Convenience sampling was also used in sampling 54 residents above 18 years from the three sub-areas. Interview guide and focus group discussion guide (data collection instruments) were used for the data collection and thus constituted the primary sources of data for the study. Collected data from the field was transcribed verbatim, cleaned, edited, and arranged into themes based on the objectives of the study. The data was analysed thematically based on the research objectives.

Major Findings
Research Objective 1: Examine the motives for which people participate in political vigilantism.

1. Individuals choose to participate in political vigilantism due to three principal motives which are economic factors, social factors and based on factors borne out of inherent traits. The economic factors specifically the quest for jobs was the main factor that influences people to join political vigilante groups.
2. There are two main ways of motivating political vigilante group members which is either by improving their economic conditions or by enhancing their social conditions. To motivate political vigilantes economically, politicians give them money, contracts, jobs in state outfits and put them on pay rolls illegally. Socially, too they use their powers to get them out of jail, orally promise them and send some abroad among others.
3. The recruitment of political vigilantes into the state security apparatus and other state institutions is a key motivating factor to join these groups. Others are recruited by their friends and others due to their well-built physical appearance. Muscular features and the ability to use violence are key recruitment indicators.
   Research Objective 2: Examine the strategies used by political vigilante groups.
4. The political vigilante groups in Kumasi metropolis are sophisticated in terms of their strategies. They are strategically sophisticated due to the use of violence as a means of seeking for their interests and a means of showing their commitment. They exhibit these sophisticated strategies during electioneering periods and other electoral related exercises by way of creating riots in the strong holds of their opponents through the snatching of ballot boxes, burning, vandalizing of properties and others.
5. Political vigilante groups use illicit drugs and utilize the services of fetish priest for charms to make the invincible. They have huge membership and direct relations with other vigilante members in other parts of the country as well as networks with politicians and people in the state security apparatus that they work arm-in-arm with.
6. The political vigilante groups can undertake these sophisticated strategies by way of getting financial support from individual politicians within the two major political parties to undertake their activities. Well-to-do politicians in the party’s finance violent loyal party foot soldiers that organise themselves together in showing such violent commitments to their parties during election related activities. The politicians also mobilise and pay some individuals to offer them private security and for undertaking violent duties of this kind. However, there are instances where the political vigilantes engage in other illegal means such as engaging in social vices like stealing, landguardism and the ilk for financing.
   Research Objective 3: Effects of the activities of political vigilante groups on human security.
   The actions of political vigilante groups in Kumasi metropolis have both negative and positive effects on the human security of individuals. However the negative effects of political vigilantism on the political security, health security, personal security, economic security and environmental security of residents by way of causing fear and want, chronic health problems, physical environmental crises, poverty and broadening inequality on the part of individuals which outstrip the positive effects of their acts on human security like encouraging electoral success, community security, securing jobs and sources of income for vigilantes.
   Research Objectives 4: Identify ways to manage political vigilantism and their effects on human security.
7. In Kumasi metropolis, state owned institutions like the NCCE, the police, the courts among others are involved in acts meant to control political vigilantism. Non-state actors like private media outlets, Muslim, and Christian religious leaders as well as an association of non-violent muscular men who do not belong to vigilante groups, have also engaged in sensitisation and other acts meant to manage the bane of political vigilantism.
8. The vigilantism and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999) meant to disband political vigilantism and its related activities has failed to achieve its goals as the sanctions prescribed by law are not effectively enforced by the various authorities.

Conclusion
Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn:
Individuals choose to participate in political vigilantism due to three salient motivation factors which are economic factors, social factors, and inherent reasons. The political vigilante groups in Kumasi metropolis are sophisticated in terms of their strategies used such that they have gained notoriety for violent acts like snatching ballot boxes, burning, vandalizing properties, attacking, and seizing public facilities, killings, and other criminal activities. It was also proven that to undertake such sophisticated strategies the political vigilante groups get their sources of finance from individual politicians within the two major political parties or fund their acts illegally by engaging in social vices for money.
The negative effects of political vigilantism on the human security of residents such as political security, health security, personal security, and environmental security by way of confronting them with individual fear and want, chronic health problems, death, physical environmental crises, poverty and aggravating inequality on their part, outstrips the positive effects of the actions of political vigilante group members on human security of residents, which makes it dangerous. The State institutions involved in activities meant to handle political vigilantism in Kumasi metropolis include the NCCE, the police and the courts to mention a few who are into sensitization and others. There have been some efforts from non-state actors in managing political vigilantism in Kumasi Metropolis too. The willingness to enforce the new law on disbanding of political vigilantism and its related offense by the various authorities is necessary in the combat of political vigilantism. One key contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge on political vigilantism within the conflict literature is its establishment of the fact that political vigilantes associated with the two major political parties in Ghana are sophisticated and they use diverse sophisticated strategies to gain advantage in electoral processes. It has also confirmed that individual politicians motivate these political vigilantes economically; by offering them money, contracts, jobs and putting them on pay rolls illegally. It also confirmed that socially, too they use their powers to get them out of jail, orally give these vigilantes promises and send some abroad among others. Most previous studies that have attempted to focus on the effects of political vigilantism like that of (Paalo, 2017; Olaiya, 2014; Baker, 2002, Asekere, 2020) did so by relating it to democracy. This study therefore contributes to knowledge by bridging this gap to show that the sophisticated strategies used by political vigilantes pose existential threats to the health security, environmental security, personal security, and economic security of residents by way of causing deaths, fear and panic, disruption of businesses and sources of income, widening inequality, causing damage to the physical environment, disenfranchising electorates and many more. These findings will be useful and constitute an opposite database for State institutions, CSOs, political parties, opinion leaders, policy makers, researchers and other stakeholders advocating and making immense efforts towards disbanding political vigilantism.

Recommendations
Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, these recommendations were made:
There should be an absolute commitment and a political will by both the NPP and NDC leadership to help enforce the vigilantism and related offences act, 2019 (Act 999), where they can name and shame those who would be caught in such acts. The politicians should not be seen preaching disbandment while they train these people secretly and finance their activities secretly too.
The NCCE should extend their sensitization programmes and peace education to include the usage of sports and other entertaining means as tools of bringing the youth together to teach them on the need to desist from violence; they should not always wait for elections before they sensitize the people.
The media should offer the civil society organisations and other state and non-state agencies ample time on their platforms for peace education. They should continue to propagate the messages for combating the scourge of political party vigilantism.
The government should allow people who would be caught by the laws to face the full rigors of the laws regardless of their political affiliations. The government or other politicians in power should not interfere in the works of the police and the Judiciary when political vigilante members and their financiers are detained. The government should refrain from recruiting these ex-political vigilante group members into the state security apparatus. The government should desist from appointing people to higher positions in the security due to their political affiliations without background checks. Government should provide the security apparatus with all the needed logistics and finance to make them an active and a confidential institution for offering security. Government should resource the NCCE, the information Service Departments and others at the District level. The government should make sustainable jobs and livelihood empowerment programmes available for the alarming youthful population.

Suggestions for Further Studies
Further studies can be carried out expansively on the extent to which political vigilantism undermines state institutions, democratic institutions, and electoral processes across the 16 regions in Ghana. Secondly, it will be remarkable if further studies can be done on the social networks and groupings within which vigilantism is embedded.

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